Prime Minister Shayea al-Zindani and Presidential Leadership Council head Rashad al-Alimi in Riyadh on February 9, 2026 // Facebook post by Rashad al-Alimi.
Since 2011, governments in Yemen have been formed based on power sharing rather than electoral entitlement, with ministerial quotas for political parties. The first such government, established under the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Initiative, was based on power-sharing between the General People's Congress, the incumbent power, and the Joint Meeting Parties, the opposition. Then, following the first Riyadh Agreement of November 2019, a division of seats between Yemenis from the North and the South was incorporated into the quota system. The new government, announced onFebruary 6, was formed under similar parameters.
Yemen's new cabinet inherits a legacy of failing public services, economic deterioration, and political crises. Previous governments were unable to bridge differences among parties that lacked common orientations, objectives, or policies. Ministers sought to represent the interests and positions of the faction to which they belonged, even when this conflicted with national policy. The new government aims to address these problems, and Riyadh has made efforts to unify decision-making and resolve internal divisions.
However, the dissolution of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) and the institutional structures and military formations it possessed, and the escalation of Saudi–Emirati tensions in Yemen, pose serious problems. Riyadh has seized control of the Yemen file amid ongoing uncertainty over whether the Emirati role has ended. Forces loyal to the UAE—despite efforts to dissolve them—remain capable of exerting influence.
In an attempt to forestall potential spoilers, Saudi Arabia has exerted efforts to ensure fair representation. It announced preparations for a South–South Dialogue conference in parallel with government formation efforts. In the government, ministerial portfolios were broadly split between North and South, but with a few reserved for eastern Yemen as its own representative bloc. However, Riyadh and the government are still contending with instability in the interim capital, Aden, and resistance to the removal of the existing armed forces from the city and its handover to a new security body, the National Security forces. It will require substantial time, resources, and preparation to establish control on the ground and ensure the safety of both citizens and the government.
The government also faces the prospect of renewed Houthi attacks. The last government was targeted by Houthi missiles on its arrival at Aden's airport soon after taking office. The risk of assassination campaigns can't be ruled out, especially with the uncontrolled proliferation of weapons after the fighting in Hadramawt.
Economically, the government lacks its most important source of revenue—oil and gas exports. Deficiencies in public revenue collection leave it at the mercy of Saudi support and the influence that comes with it. Other challenges include the organized obstruction of services and economic activity to address local grievances. Should the government fail to confront these challenges decisively, it will lose public trust before it has time to pursue the rest of its agenda.
To avoid failure, the government must unify its discourse and decision-making. It will need to create new legal frameworks to delineate the parameters for partnership within government. It must also improve transparency by appointing an official spokesperson to inform citizens of what is being done and how it will affect their lives.
The government must reassure all Yemenis that it is capable of meeting their aspirations, securing their needs, and paying their salaries, without discrimination. It must transform Aden into a model of security, service provision, and development. It must administer revenues, expenditures, and policies transparently and issue public budgets and reports for its citizens and partners. It must demonstrate that it is worthy of foreign support and public trust, while defusing the minefield of obstacles that may arise from public anger or disenfranchised political interests.
To this end, all parties must work to find a way resume oil and gas exports, which would help bolster the public treasury and stabilize the national currency. It is also imperative that the government institutionally and legally unify military and security units under the Ministries of Defense and Interior. This is necessary to consolidate decision-making, monopolize the use of force, and provide the security necessary for unified and institutionalized governance.
In parallel, the powers and mandates of local authorities should be revisited to ensure they have the authority to perform their duties effectively. This would foster greater public ownership of decision-making and the use of local resources, and build trust with communities. Doing so will require an amendment to the Local Authority Law, which governs their work, but this is a necessary reform.
The government's responsibilities are not limited to areas under its control. It must demonstrate to all Yemenis, including citizens living in Houthi-controlled areas, that it is a government of the people. An important first step would be to develop carefully calibrated arrangements for the resumption of salary payments. Their disbursement can be instrumentalized to assert national sovereignty, bring national wealth under the oversight of the Yemeni state, and prevent non-state actors from possessing weapons and wielding military power.
The new government is a last chance for Yemenis. It enjoys local and regional support and a degree of momentum from the planned Riyadh-sponsored South-South Dialogue and renewed Saudi economic support. However, there are no guarantees that this support will continue, or that it will be sufficient to ensure economic stability, improve public services, or sustain government revenues. Likewise, there is no guarantee the new cabinet will be able to bridge the political divisions and dysfunction that have undone prior governments. The new cabinet faces multiple pressing challenges. Its success will depend on how effectively it addresses them.
This commentary is part of a series of publications produced by the Sana'a Center and funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the Reimagining Yemen's Peace in the Regional Landscape program. The series seeks to bolster peacebuilding efforts in Yemen by strategically examining the country's security and economic ties with the broader Gulf and Red Sea region.
