The organization Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamiya (The Islamic Companions of the Right Hand) claimed responsibility for the stabbings of two Jewish men in London’s Golders Green neighborhood on April 29. This group, referred to by its initials “HAYI” in the UK, has recently come onto the radar of law enforcement and intelligence agencies across Europe, after it claimed to have carried out a series of attacks on Jewish and Iranian opposition targets across the continent in recent weeks.
The emerging evidence suggests that this organization is a front for elements operating on behalf of the Iranian regime. Given the nature of the attacks, HAYI appears most likely to be linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). No clear evidence or details of the process by which the group is managed have yet been made public. But a number of indications suggest that HAYI is not simply a convenient moniker for individuals acting at their own behest in support of Tehran.
Rather, it appears to offer an example of what some analysts have termed “gig economy” terrorism. This refers to a process whereby a state agency hires individuals not necessarily deeply organizationally or ideologically linked to the state in question, to carry out acts of violence on its behalf, usually in return for financial remuneration, and often on an ad hoc or one-off basis.
Claiming responsibility for terror attacks
THE TELL-TALE evidence, in the public domain, of direct state involvement in HAYI derives from the timing of its claims of responsibility and other online activity. Specifically, HAYI claimed responsibility for arson attacks on April 15 against the Finchley Reform Synagogue in north London, and the Volant Media Offices, the media company that owns Iran International, the high-profile Iranian opposition TV channel.
London’s Metropolitan Police did not confirm the attack on the Volant offices until the following morning. But at approximately the same time that the attack was taking place, an Iran-linked Telegram channel carried a claim of responsibility from HAYI, reading “targeting the building of the terrorist opposition channel Iran International in London.”
Similarly, other claims of responsibility and statements by HAYI have been first circulated on known IRGC-linked channels, in a way that would be impossible without direct links. Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, a British-Iraqi expert on jihadist groups at the Middle East Forum, told me: “Harakat Ashab al-Yamin’s claims and statements are consistently circulated first on ‘pro-resistance’ Iraqi Telegram channels, undermining the notion that this propaganda is some kind of Israeli or Western psy-op intended to cover for false-flag attacks against Jewish targets in the West.”
Tamimi is referring to the oft-circulated claim by some supporters of the Iranian regime that HAYI is a creation of Israel, intended to distract attention from Israel’s own activities.
The type of activities undertaken by HAYI would further suggest an IRGC link. The Iranian regime maintains two state entities that carry out violent activity and acts of terror abroad. These are the IRGC and the Ministry of Information and Security, commonly abbreviated to MOIS in English, and known by Iranians as the “Ettela’at.”
While the distinction is not watertight, the MOIS tends to engage in high-profile, professional-level attacks, such as the attempted bombing in 2018 of an Iranian opposition conference. That attack was carried out by an Iranian diplomat, Assadollah Assadi, working with three other European-based regime supporters.
Arson attacks on European synagogues and media channels, and building links with locals – either activists or people seeking monetary gain – tend to fit more with the IRGC nexus. In this regard, it’s worth noting that the IRGC often makes use of its various Arab franchise and proxy groups (such as Lebanese Hezbollah and the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces) in managing relationships with other organizations.
Thus, both Lebanese and Iraqi personnel are present in Yemen and are actively engaged in assisting the Houthis in their training and military activities. Networks and representatives of these groups may be similarly engaged with HAYI.
IRGC most likely to be operating the organization conducting terror attacks in Britain, Europe
THE PUBLICLY available evidence suggests that the Iranian IRGC is the body most likely to be operating this organization, which is currently engaged in a campaign of terror on British and European soil. The individuals arrested so far for involvement in this campaign are non-Iranians, without a long history of involvement in activity on behalf of the Tehran regime.
HAYI claimed responsibility for an arson attack that torched four ambulances belonging to the Hatzolah Jewish charity in north London on March 23. Four individuals have now been arrested and charged with arson; three of them have been named. They are Hamza Iqbal, 20; Rehan Khan, 19; and Judex Atshatshi, 18. A fourth person arrested has not been named because he is a minor.
According to British media reports, Iqbal, Khan, and the unnamed individual are British and Pakistani citizens. The three individuals arrested for the attack on Iran International also included a 16-year-old boy.
Essa Suleiman, 45, has been arrested for the May 1 Golders Green stabbing attacks, for which HAYI has also claimed responsibility. Suleiman is Somali-born, but holds British citizenship. It is worth noting that HAYI’s claim of responsibility did not include privileged information; it is possible that the group chose to claim responsibility after the fact. This remains to be ascertained.
None of these individuals is Iranian. What is known about their biographies, along with the age of some of the suspects, suggests that they are not veteran or trained IRGC operatives.
Given the clear Islamic affiliations of many of those named, it is possible, and even likely, that they acted out of some element of ideological or religious commitment. But their recruitment by HAYI and those behind it seems likely to have followed the ad hoc, disposable approach typical of “gig economy” terrorism.
This parallels the recruiting pattern used by the Iranians to enlist Israeli spies
THIS TYPE of recruitment, it’s worth noting, parallels the recruiting pattern adopted by the Iranians in their use of Israeli nationals for espionage and terror activity in Israel over the last three years. The use by states of criminal networks and unaffiliated individuals is part of the landscape of modern conflict. Given the technical challenges of remaining long off the grid, unobserved, or under an assumed identity in the modern context, this type of recruitment has obvious advantages.
As in other variants of the “gig economy,” it also has a positive aspect for the employer, who has no commitment or responsibilities regarding the employee. One intelligence officer colorfully observed to me: the difference between utilizing such individuals and sending state employees is like the difference between using a piloted aircraft or a drone.
So the IRGC, the evidence would suggest, is running an active antisemitic terror campaign on British soil, yet it hasn’t been proscribed in Britain. The current British government has committed to enacting emergency legislation to finally ban the group. It remains to be seen if this will materialize.
Keir Starmer’s government is heavily dependent on the support of British Muslims; this may be affecting its decision-making, though it is still considered impolite in British political discussion to point this out.
The US and Israel’s battle with Iran is “not our war,” the British prime minister said this week. In the meantime, attacks on Jewish targets on British soil by HAYI, an organization clearly backed by the Iranian state, are taking place on a weekly basis.
