The post The Past Can Wait: Memory Construction, Victims, and Reconciliation in Yemen appeared first on Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies.
Reconciliation is usually tackled in the aftermath of a settlement of violent conflict – during the transition from violence to peace.[1] The International Center for Transitional Justice defines reconciliation as “a complex set of processes that involve building or rebuilding relationships, often in the aftermath of massive and widespread human rights violations.”[2] However, in scenarios of protracted conflict – as in Yemen – it is challenging to establish a roadmap and clear pathways for reconciliation.[3] Conflicts lasting decades pose numerous challenges for articulating an individual’s or group’s experience of suffering and harm under a well-accepted definition of victimhood,[4] and for processes of memory, forgiveness, and healing.
This paper focuses on processes of memory construction in Yemen through the perspective of political narratives about the ongoing armed conflict. The objective is to provide a preliminary assessment of the attitudes of key Yemeni political actors and their impact on the formation of official narratives about the conflict and on the articulation of key beliefs and discourses about victimhood.
Definitions of victimhood inform “how well society is able to account for and develop policy to address diverse experiences of conflict.”[5] Informed by this line of inquiry, this paper also integrates the views of a select number of Yemeni civil society representatives on processes of memory construction as a space for discussing past violence, integrating victims’ narratives, and acknowledging harm.
This study is divided into three parts. The first part examines how different political actors in Yemen approach and shape memory to promote political narratives about the conflict. It also analyses key “memory practices” implemented by political actors, and how these constitute a framework for interpreting the past that prioritizes martyrdom narratives. In the second part, the study outlines the main representational precarities that victims face in Yemen as a result of this focus on martyrdom and how these are reflected in recent measures taken by the internationally recognized government vis-à-vis victims. The third part includes perspectives from select civil society organizations on dealing with the past in Yemen from the perspective of memorialization, memory work, and other processes of remembrance. The conclusion provides a summary of the main points surveyed in the report and recommendations for a victim-centered approach to memorialization and dealing with the past in Yemen.
Research on transitional justice in Yemen has met resistance because it questions structures of power, revealing how individual and collective actors are connected and how decision-making processes inform the allocation of political power and resources. It also has a markedly ethical dimension, as it touches on the vulnerability of victims and survivors and the complex factors that have led to their disempowerment in Yemeni society. The methodological approach used in this study takes into consideration these issues whilst trying to capture two different dynamics: the political discourses and politicization of memorialization in Yemen that hinder victim empowerment; and potential sites of politics and governance that may help Yemenis “make sense of violence as well as imagine and enact lives that sit alongside these experiences of harm.”[6]
The period selected for this research spans from April 2022, when the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) was established, until April 2025. The study analyzed the language used by political leaders to describe the conflict, its participants, and memorialization and commemoration in Yemen, particularly in social media spaces and on official websites. It draws from statements made by prominent pro-government actors between April 2022 and April 2025, as well as from select statements made by members of the de facto authorities in Sana’a during the same period. This broad dissemination of political rhetoric, which casts opposing actors as mercenaries, terrorists, illegitimate, or foreign, suggests a collective reluctance to pursue conciliation by political leaders. The polarized nature of the discourse crowds out other narratives and creates obstacles to a victim-centered approach of memorialization and transitional justice. Further, these narratives are projected onto existing foci of collective memory, notably national holidays, encouraging the proliferation of new holidays imbued with partisan content. Rhetorical efforts to delegitimize members of other belligerent parties and a strong emphasis on martyrdom discourses pose obstacles to the recognition of violations and reparation to victims.
Against this background, the study surveyed a select number of representatives from Yemeni civil society organizations. Semi-structured qualitative interviews were organized around seven open-ended questions addressing a diverse array of topics, including the role of memory sites as spaces for education, the participation of civil society – including survivors and victims – in memorialization activities, and the transformation of personal and collective suffering into acts of healing and reconciliation. The questions were used to gather feedback based on participants’ experiences and knowledge, aiming to identify key directions and patterns for memorialization and memory processes in Yemen. These interviews are part of ongoing efforts led by the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies to feature victims’ and survivors’ voices in research and other knowledge production processes. The goal is to establish an evidence base to ensure that decisions and actions regarding transitional justice in Yemen are informed directly by victims, rather than having state authorities and other institutions – including international organizations – deciding what Yemeni victims and survivors need and want.
Conflicts include an important component of armed confrontations and hostilities, but they also create a struggle between parties “for the perception, legitimacy and control over the story that defines winners and losers.”[7] An important part of the confrontation is the collective memory of the conflict[8] and the use of interpretations and narratives of the past to legitimize actions and perpetuate violence and conflict in the present.[9]
In the period under review (April 2022 – April 2025), political actors aligned with Yemen’s internationally recognized government, including representatives on its Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), portrayed the conflict with the Houthi group (Ansar Allah) as “a battle between state and non-state, between order and chaos, between republic and imamate.”[10] The common enemy was the “terrorist Houthi militias.”[11] They were: “the worst version of a dynastic clergy system,”[12] characterized by their “priesthood”[13] and “arrogance,”[14] amongst other attributes. The Houthis had an “expansionist project in the country,”[15] backed by Iran. By emphasizing these elements, political actors within the government contribute to an understanding and perception of the conflict as “a battle for liberation”[16] from the “Houthi terrorist militias.”[17]
National holidays and other occasions, such as ceremonies involving speeches, the laying of wreaths, and the inauguration of memorial sites, constitute important “carriers of memory”[18] in Yemen, and contribute to shared understandings of the past and a sense of collective memory. They have now been repurposed by all parties to the conflict to fit “us versus them” narratives. In areas under the control of the internationally recognized government, holidays constitute an important occasion for political actors to voice ideological opposition to the Houthis and “the Imami project supported by the Iranian regime.”[19] Unity Day, celebrated on May 22, marking the unification of North and South Yemen in 1990, has been recast by some government officials in reference to the current conflict, “for facing challenges and threats, including those posed by Iran and its terrorist arms.”[20]
But national holidays have also served as platforms that expose the fissures on the government side. In April 2022, the same presidential decree that delegated power to the PLC established a Consultation and Reconciliation Commission (CRC) to consolidate “national consensus, unity of ranks, and desired partnership.”[21] However, in-fighting within the PLC created practical difficulties for the CRC in carrying out its mandate. Despite the establishment of a dedicated sub-committee on reconciliation and transitional justice, different members and parties within the government continued to pursue their own respective narratives that supported their versions of the past. Commemorations held by the Southern Transitional Council (STC), for example, highlight a separate, national (Southern) identity based on a common awareness of events, narratives, and ideas within the framework of South Yemen’s territory.[22] A day before Unity Day, the group commemorates Declaration of Disengagement Day on May 21, marking a failed 1994 attempt at Southern secession.[23]
The Houthis celebrate some of the national days commemorated by government-aligned actors, but have also instituted their own holidays to supersede them. September 26, which marks the anniversary of the 1962 revolution that overthrew the Imamate, has been supplanted by a holiday on September 21, marking the Houthis’ 2014 seizure of Sana’a. In recent years, the group has used excessive force and launched violent crackdowns on protesters and marchers marking the September 26 holiday.[24]
One consequence of the depiction of the conflict in Yemen as a binary positioning of two main sides – one “right” and the other “wrong”- is the portrayal of fallen soldiers and fighters as heroic sacrifices for a greater cause. On the government side, soldiers and fighters who fall in battle for the liberation of Yemen are considered martyrs. They are the ones “giving their blood” so that Yemenis can live “in freedom and dignity.”[25] Martyrs are “heroic,”[26] “the symbols of victory, freedom, and dignity,”[27] “heroes who write with their pure blood the most wonderful heroic and sacrificial deeds,”[28] and “righteous.”[29] In official statements, the STC calls for “Glory and immortality to the martyrs of the South.”[30]
The Houthis have a broader “geography of martyrdom” that relies on a different narrative to justify their cause. With the outbreak of the war in Gaza, the group’s anti-imperialist and anti-Western political stance hardened. This posture, and the Houthis’ involvement in the broader Middle East crisis, have had practical consequences in terms of discourses of martyrdom, which no longer remain limited to the territory of Yemen, but also memorialize people who have lost their lives for Gaza and Palestine: “loyalty to the blood of the martyrs, with Gaza until victory.”[31]
For reconciliation and other processes aspiring to heal societal wounds, the emphasis placed on martyrdom presents many obstacles.[32] Soldiers and fighters are portrayed as great heroes who stand firm at the frontlines to protect the Yemeni homeland from “occupiers”[33] and “colonizers.”[34] Their lives – which belong to a cause greater than themselves – are surrendered with selfless sacrifice. However, a construction that over-exceptionalizes heroes leaves little room for anyone else. Conflict victims, and the devastating consequences they have suffered, are largely absent – except to the extent that they fit within the hero/martyr narrative.
The emphasis on martyrs to legitimize and reinforce the liberation narrative constitutes an existing structure, a schema that assimilates other categories of people affected by the conflict. For instance, the difficulties that families go through – economic hardship, and lack of access to adequate housing and clean water, to name only a few – are framed by the government as the result of a catastrophic humanitarian situation caused by the “Iranian regime-backed Houthi terrorist militias.”[35] In such a scenario, families acquire martyr-like qualities. Their suffering renders them part of the same group as martyrs and gives them a political edge that is not readily available to others who have suffered violence in Yemen.
Similarly, women are portrayed as “fighters for human dignity”[36] who are “resisting the compelling circumstances of war to protect the identity of our country, its social fabric and the future of successive generations.”[37] They have stood “with their male brethren”[38] and have “sacrificed themselves in the battle for the liberation, the greatest meaning of sacrifice.”[39] As victims of conflict-related violations, women are nevertheless largely invisible even though they continue to be disproportionally impacted by conflict and violence with very limited access to justice or redress.[40]
One important characteristic of the current system and political discourse is the extension of the recognition of the suffering and sacrifice of martyrs to their relatives and families– that is, to social units that are biologically related to martyrs. By doing so, the system overlooks non-biological relationships[41] and alternative forms of connection, care, and belonging. The recognition of victims by the state is, from this perspective, challenging, as it marks a departure from the existing system, which prioritizes a biological framework for the recognition of certain rights. A broader notion of “victim” thus challenges traditional views about the state and the meaning of citizenship, and seeks to foreground an alternative approach based on the recognition of victims as deserving of rights, notably the right to a remedy and reparations.[42]
One factor that renders this even more difficult in Yemen is the lack of a definition of a victim. In other words, there is no legal category for victims of armed conflict and violence. Yemen’s criminal code and other legal instruments define offenses and the corresponding punishments for violations. However, these offenses are different than those committed during armed conflict, which include war crimes and crimes against humanity. It is also not entirely clear what definition would apply to victims of violations that have not necessarily taken place during armed conflict, such as enforced disappearances.[43]
Victims continue to exist in a legal gap due to inadequate norms under Yemen’s legal system and the failure to implement existing laws. Such problems predate the war – the definition of victimhood, and distinctions between victims and martyrs, were given significant attention by working groups at the National Dialogue Conference. The conference revealed a considerable divergence of views about such classifications, both between working groups and with respect to the contemporary national unity government.[44]
An aggravating factor is the near-total absence of the terms “victim” or “survivor” in the discourse of the political actors surveyed for this report. As a result, victims and survivors are assimilated into pre-existing structures and normative frameworks that apply to other categories of people. In many situations, victims are redefined and glossed as martyrs, particularly within the current political discourse.
This section includes findings based on consultations carried out with a select number of Yemeni civil society representatives working on diverse human rights issues. The perspectives below suggest paths that could help ensure that memorialization acknowledges the suffering of victims in Yemen, that future memorialization processes complement other transitional justice mechanisms, and, above all, that they help prevent the recurrence of human rights violations and abuses.
The Sana’a Center will continue organizing consultations with various stakeholders, including minorities, women, and youth, in order to obtain a broader set of views and build a body of knowledge that can support future initiatives in the field of memorialization. The following perspectives highlight considerations that should guide future efforts in the realm of memorialization and lay the ground for future transitional justice efforts in Yemen.
Participants highlighted the importance of working on transitional justice in a holistic manner and insisted that memorialization initiatives should not be carried out to the detriment of other transitional justice mechanisms, such as accountability. As one interviewee noted, “multiple mechanisms for transitional justice are needed in Yemen.”[45] One proposal concerned the establishment of an independent body to oversee the transitional justice file, which would include memorialization processes. According to another interviewee, “this entity should be composed of technocrats and selected according to very high standards. It should lead, inter alia, discussions about the best approach and mechanisms for the Yemeni context, whether the country should pursue transitional justice or reconciliatory justice.”[46] According to another interviewee, the future members of this authority “should be untainted by blood or involvement in past conflicts.”[47]
Among those consulted, some were unsure about the feasibility of working on memorialization whilst the conflict is still ongoing. Other participants, however, pointed out that there are already so-called memory initiatives taking place across the country. Examples included the Memory Museum in Taiz,[48] inaugurated in September 2025, and a memory installation in the Al-Dhahi passage on the southwest side of the city.[49] There were also references to initiatives that pre-dated 2014, such as murals in Aden dedicated to the forcibly disappeared, and those in Sana’a by artist Murad Subay, designed to shed light on the unknown fate and whereabouts of thousands of missing persons in Yemen. Other examples included the publication of an investigative piece on enforced disappearances by the Al-Niddaa newspaper in 2011. The Al-Liqa newspaper also published a book on enforced disappearances that have occurred during different historical periods, going back to 1962.
Interviewees also pointed to other memory initiatives in Yemen, such as the holidays in September and in October, which mark “milestones in Yemeni history.” However, the majority of existing initiatives are not integrated into a broader strategy for dealing with the past. One participant described the past as a “living political force.”[50] For this interviewee, without genuine efforts to “resolve the issues of the past,” “the past will keep returning and reproducing itself in our social, political, and every[day] life.”[51] A reckoning with the past, especially with a violent past, requires political commitment and support. In addition, the participation of civil society is fundamental to fostering truth, empowering victims, and preventing the manipulation of sites of memory for political purposes. As one interviewee pointed out, “the idea of memorialization initiated by a governance actor raises many questions about impartiality.”[52]
For the participants, documentation constitutes one of the most important aspects of memorialization, recording important factual information about events. Personal testimonies also play a key role in memorialization processes as they allow victims and survivors to share their experiences of conflict and violence. They reflect inherently subjective experiences, but contribute to establishing the truth about victims and perpetrators. Interviewees considered it important to have standards for corroborating the veracity of information. According to one interviewee, “stories must be verified, documented, and true. There are many fabricated stories and accounts of violations. Truth must be the primary standard for any story.”[53]
When asked how victims’ perspectives can be integrated in memorialization processes without re-traumatizing them, one interviewee emphasized that any interaction with victims must preserve their “safety, to avoid them being targeted again.”[54] Another interviewee said that in dealing with victims, the principle of informed consent throughout all stages of testimony collection was paramount.[55] Furthermore, it was considered important to provide safe spaces for interviews with victims and survivors in order to prevent exposure to political and other types of influence; to ensure the anonymity of information from those providing their testimonies; and to provide psychological assistance in order to emotionally support victims during the process of documenting traumatic events.
Interviewees highlighted the importance of involving victims and their families, civil society organizations, and the broader community in consultations about memorialization and related activities. But this involvement would likely not be the same across Yemen. As one interviewee explained, “before launching any memorialization project, we must first understand what the people of each governorate want in terms of transitional justice. Civilian victims know best what is appropriate for their areas.”[56]
Consultations should also involve civil society organizations, organizations with technical mandates and expertise – such as the National Commission for the Investigation of Alleged Human Rights Violations and the National Committee for Prisoners and Detainees, lawyers and legal experts, journalists, artists, academic institutions, and governmental and local authorities, among others. Echoing an earlier point, some participants argued that these processes should be overseen by an independent authority responsible for memorialization and the broader transitional justice file.
This independent body would help prevent the political manipulation of narratives and, in addition, would promote the inclusivity of victims who are often marginalized or forgotten in memorialization processes, such as minorities, youth, and women. One interviewee explained that in the case of women, “they are directly affected, deeply pained, and often silent in ongoing conflicts. They must be consulted as a key group whose voices must be heard.”[57] Another interviewee explained that “We need to keep in mind the importance of not forgetting the neglected ones, people from minorities, from disadvantaged groups, and others who are unfortunately easily forgotten.”[58]
Interviewees considered education fundamental for reconciliation. One interviewee explained that education was important to prevent the misuse of memorialization: “Our biggest challenge with memorialization and memorial sites is that some people may feel tempted to use them as sites to judge others. We need to resist that and to work hard on a culture of listening and understanding.”[59] Interviewees also said that generally, memorialization processes should be based on Yemen’s diversity and on the multiplicity of experiences within its society. As another interviewee noted, “memorialization should tell first and foremost a story about our diversity as Yemenis.”[60] In order for this to happen, it was considered essential to make Yemen’s education systems respond to the country’s multicultural diversity.
Furthermore, memorialization processes should build on stories that “mend wounds” and that “help avoid the repetition of suffering.” According to one interviewee, memory sites should thus draw from “inspirational and motivating stories” that showcase resilience and transformation, and not turn sites of memory into places “of bloodshed, confrontation, and negativity.”[61] It was also considered very important for future activities – such as remembrance activities and others falling under the umbrella of memorialization – to be handled with sensitivity. Unless managed in this manner, memory work in Yemen could easily “reignite old wounds.”[62] It was therefore considered important to remain mindful of this risk and to handle any activities and processes “with great sensitivity – in a way that promotes transitional justice and reconciliation and not the opposite.”[63]
It was suggested that one way to avoid scenarios of confrontation was to keep sight of the end goal of memorialization and other transitional justice processes: “avoiding the repetition of the same mistakes and of suffering” and “[leaving] an example for future generations to learn from.”[64] Education was said to play a very important role in this process as a vector to “promote understanding of the diversity within the country.”[65] One interviewee highlighted that “the most important thing when addressing violence, internal conflicts, and civil wars, is to include in our education system the values of dialogue and diversity.”[66]
This paper is guided by the belief that the construction of memory and the ways in which the past is memorialized are fundamental factors affecting Yemeni society’s ability to heal from a violent past and achieve sustainable reconciliation. In developing a way forward that promotes memory of the past and memorialization practices, many reflections and discussions remain to be held on how to proceed with the physical, emotional, and psychological scars left by conflicts and violence in Yemen[67]: How can society deal with the past without reopening wounds? Without jeopardizing the prospects of a future peace agreement? How far back in the country’s history should memory processes reach? How can we prevent the manipulation of memorialization?
To date, political dialogue on victims and on other transitional justice issues has been very limited. Despite the important breakthrough achieved during the 2025 Yemen International Forum,[68] which featured a session with political party representatives on the topic of transitional justice, more engagement with Yemen’s political class is needed. This report has documented the extent to which political actors continue framing each other as violent antagonists, rendering them reluctant to pursue reconciliation or embark on a broader process of reckoning with the past and with the harm that Yemenis have suffered. It also argues that attempts to develop a victim-centered approach to transitional justice in Yemen will have to contend with the focus of political actors on war narratives and martyrdom discourses. Acknowledging the diverse experiences of victims from across Yemeni society and promoting platforms where victims share their views in their own voices are critical steps for reconciliation. Memorialization has a fundamental role to play in this process by helping to create a public memory of the past and ensuring that victims’ experiences are acknowledged as part of Yemen’s history.[69]
Memorialization is the fifth pillar of transitional justice, alongside accountability, truth-telling, reparation, and guarantees of non-recurrence.[70] According to the Special Rapporteur on Truth, Justice, Reparation and Guarantees of Non-Recurrence, memorialization is a vital tool for enabling societies to emerge from the cycle of hatred and conflict and begin taking definite steps towards building a culture of peace.[71] The following recommendations are offered as a guide for national and international stakeholders to promote memorialization and other processes for dealing with the past that take into consideration their sensitive and delicate nature in the Yemeni context and that are meaningful for – and informed by – those who have been most affected by violations and violence. The recommendations are a starting point for further practice and knowledge production on dealing with the past, healing, and reconciliation in Yemen. Yemeni civil society organizations have a fundamental role to play in further developing best practices to achieve comprehensive, inclusive guidance that adequately supports truth and memory initiatives in Yemen.
This publication was produced as part of the Supporting Political Dialogue for Peace in Yemen program, implemented by the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies and CMI-Martti Ahtisaari Peace Foundation and funded by the European Union.
Endnotes
The post Women’s Political Participation in Yemen: Institutional Pathways and Dynamics of Inclusion appeared first on Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies.
The post Digital Narratives and Houthi Detentions of Humanitarian Workers: X, Propaganda, and the Erosion of Civic Space in Yemen appeared first on Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies.
The post Youth as Drivers of Transitional Justice appeared first on Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies.
The post The Houthis Strike Israel, Join the Regional Fray appeared first on Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies.