The Ninth Party Congress aftermath: What Kim Jong Un’s era really means

North Korea’s five-yearly marquee political event, the Ninth WPK Party Congress (Feb. 19-25), has now concluded. Since December of last year, this writer has been producing a series of analytical pieces focused on forecasting the congress, in view of its significance for the 15-year Kim Jong Un regime and its likely impact on inter-Korean relations going forward.

The more, the better

North Korea is a closed state. Accurate diagnoses and forecasts are therefore difficult, and being wrong is common. Even so, analysts of all persuasions must produce as many forecasts as possible. Only then can debate flourish and government agencies examine multiple perspectives and scenarios, positioning themselves to prepare proactively and creatively.

Without that diversity of input, fixed assumptions or wishful thinking on the part of individual officials or senior policymakers can take hold and lead to failures of intelligence judgment and policy. It is even better when analysts are willing to play the role of a red team. That said, jumping straight from a single data point to sweeping conclusions without logical reasoning, or mechanically applying past patterns, must be avoided.

Thesis, antithesis, synthesis

The purpose of reviewing a go game after it is over, or making an error log while studying, is the same: to avoid repeating the same mistakes and produce better results. With that in mind, it is worth revisiting the key forecasting questions surrounding the Ninth WPK Congress.

On timing and North Korean movements, this writer predicted the congress would open in late February or later, not in the early part of the year as Pyongyang initially suggested, and not in early February as most experts predicted after that initial announcement had come and gone. This writer also forecast that Pyongyang would conduct a large-scale psychological warfare campaign targeting its own population around the congress, stoking anti-South Korean sentiment by invoking the drone incident (regardless of any apology from the Lee Jae-myung administration) and the ROK-U.S. joint military exercises.

The reasoning behind the late-February prediction rested on what this writer considered a smoking gun: the fact that North Korea held its December WPK plenary session somewhat earlier than usual (Dec. 9), even though it typically does not convene a year-end plenary when a congress is planned for early in the following year. Taken together with Kim Jong Un’s ongoing field inspections (which implied targets were not being met) and the rapidly shifting international landscape, the timing pointed clearly to late February or later.

The prediction about an aggressive anti-South Korea psychological warfare campaign, however, did not pan out. North Korea did not follow its usual playbook. This appears to reflect North Korea’s judgment that maintaining a low-key posture, as it has done until now, is the more advantageous approach given the sensitivity of the “two hostile states” doctrine, which represents a repudiation of the previous policy toward the South. The non-disclosure of the detailed revisions to the party bylaws fits the same pattern. The Lee Jae-myung administration’s continued preemptive conciliatory gestures toward Pyongyang also likely played a role.

On core content and messaging, this writer predicted the congress would focus on the following: publicizing Kim Jong Un’s achievements and reaffirming the frontal breakthrough campaign grounded in nuclear capability and self-sufficiency; announcing new five-year plans for national defense and economic development; enshrining in the party bylaws the five-point party-building line for a “new era,” Kim Jong Un’s revolutionary ideology, and the two-hostile-states doctrine toward South Korea; articulating a dual-track posture toward the U.S., namely conditional dialogue alongside confrontation; ignoring and expressing hostility toward South Korea; executing a generational leadership transition, with Kim Yo Jong returning to the WPK Political Bureau as an alternate member; and assessing the probability of formally designating Kim Ju Ae as successor as low, with her participation in the military parade seen as the more likely scenario.

All of these predictions proved accurate. They were rooted in an understanding of Kim Jong Un’s confidence in his own record after 15 years in power, especially his aggressive policies such as nuclear development and the dispatch of troops to the Russia-Ukraine war, as well as his efforts since December 2023 to differentiate himself from his predecessors through the two-hostile-states doctrine. On relations with South Korea and the United States, the analysis centered on Kim’s view of the political landscape, specifically his deep structural concern about the Korean Wave and his tendency to prioritize alignment with China and Russia over engagement with Washington.

Looking ahead

The Kim Jong Un era has now opened in earnest. The conclusions of his work review at the congress contain both strategic and tactical elements that will shape Pyongyang’s next moves. In the near term, Kim appears set to pursue what might be called the “Kim Jong Un-style socialist system-building line” by: first, completely severing inter-Korean ties; second, pursuing internal stability through nuclear capability enhancement, self-sufficiency, and ideological control; and third, deepening relations with China and Russia before cautiously exploring conditional contact with the United States.

Against that backdrop, the question of whether a Trump-Kim contact could materialize around the time of the anticipated Beijing U.S.-China summit in April is, in this writer’s assessment, not particularly high. Several factors point in that direction: the gap between Pyongyang’s conditions for dialogue (recognition of its nuclear status and withdrawal of hostile policy) and Washington’s stated preference for talks without preconditions; the fact that North Korea will be focused on congress follow-up measures and China-Russia diplomacy in the near term; and the current priorities of the Trump administration. North Korea will likely calculate that the closer it gets to the November U.S. midterm elections, rather than the first half of the year, the more leverage it holds. Trump, meanwhile, is preoccupied with domestic affairs, ending the Russia-Ukraine war, and managing developments in Latin America and the Middle East under his America First agenda.

Kim Yo Jong’s expanding role

Following the congress, North Korea disclosed that Kim Yo Jong’s official title is director of the WPK General Affairs Department, a post responsible for managing the party’s internal operations. This means her authority, already exercised in close proximity to her brother, will only be further consolidated. In other words, continuing as she has until now to oversee inter-Korean and foreign affairs overall (presumably as leader of the standing committee) while also taking charge of party administration, she will function as a genuine power broker and all-purpose operative within the regime.

Key political calendar ahead

Looking at North Korea’s upcoming political schedule, Pyongyang will convene the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA), the equivalent of a national legislature, to translate the congress’s decisions into law and policy and form a new cabinet. This task will likely fall to the current 14th SPA, which has already extended its term by more than two years. An announcement on elections for delegates to a new SPA is also expected imminently. Separately, a campaign to mobilize the entire society through conferences of mass organizations such as the General Federation of Trade Unions will be sustained throughout the first half of the year.

Conclusion

What, then, must South Korea do? The first priority is to confront squarely Kim Jong Un’s extreme anxiety about the Korean Wave. North Korea is the only country on earth where consuming Korean Wave content is illegal, and the fact that even the threat of the death penalty has not succeeded in stopping it has driven Kim to deny any shared ethnic identity with South Koreans and attempt a complete blockade at its source. That reality must be clearly understood.

South Korea must also never lose sight of the fact that North Korea’s nuclear forces are growing at an exponential rate, and that forward deployment of tactical nuclear weapons capable of incinerating South Korea, including 600mm multiple rocket launchers, is actively underway. Given that Kim Jong Un and Kim Yo Jong openly threaten and intimidate in this way today, what they may be capable of in five to ten years defies imagination.

The South Korean government must therefore continue knocking on the door toward restoring inter-Korean ties as part of building a peace framework on the Korean peninsula, but without becoming fixated on it. Idealism and patience cannot be a substitute for policy. The government must face reality squarely, mobilize every available means, and advance with confidence down the path befitting a liberal democracy. With a long-term perspective, it must expand its engagement with the broader international community while concentrating its efforts on expanding humanitarian and cultural contact with the North Korean people. It goes without saying that in an era of global alliances and networks, allowing cracks in coordination with friendly nations by placing excessive emphasis on ethnic solidarity and self-reliance would be a grave mistake.

One final word for the South Korean press. When 13-year-old Kim Ju Ae appeared at the military parade dressed in leather clothing, high heels, and a permed hairstyle that made her look like an adult, and then personally fired live rounds with a sniper rifle, every newspaper and broadcaster churned out the same speculative, sensationalist coverage about the succession question. Not one outlet offered a word of criticism from the standpoint of adolescent emotional development. A 13-year-old child is being groomed in the art of war, paraded before the world as a symbol of dynastic power, and stripped of any semblance of a normal childhood, yet South Korea’s media saw only a story about who will one day inherit the throne. That silence is its own kind of failure.

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