On the second anniversary of the revolution since the fall of the Assad regime, have its earliest aims—freedom, justice, dignity and the rule of law—been achieved, or is the journey far from over? The post ‘A long way to go’: As Syrians commemorate the revolution, has it achieved its goals? appeare
On the second anniversary of the revolution since the fall of the Assad regime, have its earliest aims—freedom, justice, dignity and the rule of law—been achieved, or is the journey far from over?
18 March 2026
Fifteen years ago, the spark of the Syrian revolution was lit in Daraa province and spread, launching a series of events that would lead to the fall of the Assad regime on December 8, 2024.
This year, for the second year in a row, Syrians are marking the March 18 anniversary of the revolution in a post-Assad Syria. In 2025, many celebrated with soaring ambitions and hopes for the future, but little practical experience of the country’s new administration and its institutions. Answers to the question of whether the demands of the 2011 revolution had been met could only be imprecise.
Last year’s anniversary also came just after a wave of violence on the Syrian coast, where the new authorities’ security forces and allied groups killed over 1,400 people, mostly Alawite civilians, following a coordinated attack by pro-Assad insurgents that had killed hundreds of their personnel.
Months later, the country was shaken again, this time by clashes and killings in Suwayda that left scores of Druze and Bedouin civilians dead and injured and created a profound, so far unresolvable, rift between the southern province and the new government in Damascus.
Over the months that followed, efforts to reach and implement a comprehensive integration agreement between Damascus and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the northeast were marked by false starts and frustrations, culminating in armed clashes and a new agreement this past January. This time, integration efforts have led to tangible changes on the ground, but unresolved questions remain.
This year, Syrians have more information to work with to assess the new authorities’ performance, gauge the level of satisfaction with services and consider whether Syrians have reached the freedom, justice and dignity they chanted for in the earliest demonstrations in 2011.
Syria Direct’s Walid Al Nofal speaks with a range of participants in Syria’s civil, political and human rights movements to learn their perspectives on the outcome of the revolution so far—when it comes to accountability, press freedom, transitional justice, Kurdish rights, local administration, corruption and more. Have its earliest aims been achieved, or is the journey far from over?
Fadel Abdul Ghany, head of the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR):
On a personal level, do you feel what you were calling for early on in the revolution against the former regime has been achieved?
I came to this work in the spring of 2011, as a witness to a glaring void. Everyone was preoccupied with political theorizing, in the hopes that the regime would quickly collapse, while the lists of martyrs and detainees grew longer with no serious system for documentation. I decided then to separate revolutionary work and human rights work, a decision that left me outside some revolutionary circles.
What I have achieved on a personal level is establishing a working model based on rigorous, systematic documentation that can have a real political and legal impact. Over the years, this effort has accumulated and earned SNHR the credibility that has made it an essential source used by the [United Nations (UN)] Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights [OCHR], the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism for Syria [IIIM], the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons [OPCW], UNICEF and many foreign ministries. This is the true meaning of the slogan “no justice without accountability”: It is both a working method and an institutional creed.
What remains unfulfilled, however, is the fundamental objective of “actual accountability.” The fall of the Assad regime is a profoundly significant historical event, but it does not wipe away the legacy of impunity the regime accumulated over the course of decades. Many war criminals are still at large.
From a human rights perspective, is achieving justice a prerequisite for the victory of the revolution?
There can be no talk of “victory,” in its full sense, unless the ousting of the regime is coupled with an effective justice system. The fall of the regime on December 8, 2024 was a necessary condition, but is not enough. The Syrian revolution was launched for dignity, the rule of law and accountability. These values are not measured by the moment of the fall, but by what happens the day after.
What are the main challenges facing the transitional justice process in Syria today, particularly regarding holding perpetrators to account? Do you believe an absence of accountability could reproduce violations in the future?
First, there is the judiciary and legal framework: Syria’s judicial system suffers from the legacy of the repressive Baathist structure, and needs radical reform before it can be entrusted with trials for war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Second, the forcibly disappeared: As of August 2025, SNHR has documented at least 177,057 cases of enforced disappearance since March 2011. The Assad regime is responsible for more than 90 percent of them. Uncovering their fate will take tremendous effort, and a long time.
Third, accountability and impunity: What concerns me most is the selective approach to accountability, through reaching settlements with some of the Assad regime’s military and economic arms at the expense of the principle of comprehensive accountability. This entrenches a culture of impunity.
What are the most pressing issues that have not been addressed, more than a year after the fall of Assad?
The urgent, unfinished issues are political participation, pluralism and respect for the Constitutional Declaration. The absence of a participatory constitutional framework that guarantees the rights of all and a fair distribution of power keeps the country on the brink of recurring identity-based crises.
Certainly, there is also the transitional justice file, which needs great efforts, capabilities and expertise to move forward.
Mouzon Morshed, head of the Syrian Journalists Association (SJA):
How do you assess the state of press freedom in Syria since the fall of the Assad regime?
After the fall of the Assad regime, one could say there was an initial breakthrough in press freedom, especially at the level of breaking the barrier of fear and the proliferation of media platforms. This in itself is an important shift, compared to a period when the press was completely controlled in a closed security system.
However, this improvement remains incomplete and unstable. Freedom of expression has not yet evolved into a firmly established legal and institutional framework. It is still contingent on shifting margins, which makes any definitive assessment premature. We are facing a transitional period that holds real promise, but it needs consolidation and clear guarantees.
How has the working environment changed for journalists, in terms of security and access to information, and what challenges still hinder their work?
Compared to before, the working environment for journalists has seen some improvement in terms of mobility and access to diverse sources of information. However, the matter of safety is still fragile and worrying in some areas.
The challenges have not disappeared—they have changed shape. The danger is no longer only from direct repression. There are challenges such as a lack of clear legislation protecting journalists, a lack of transparency in some institutions and the spread of media chaos and misinformation, as well as indirect political or societal pressures.
The environment is less closed, in other words, but not yet safe enough to practice fully independent and professional journalism.
As you see it, can what has been achieved so far be considered a victory for media freedom, or is there still a long way to go to build an independent and professional press in Syria?
What has been achieved can be considered an important step towards media freedom, but it is not a final victory. The real victory is measured not only in the disappearance of direct censorship, but in the establishment of an integrated system that includes laws guaranteeing press freedom and protecting journalists, truly independent media organizations, clear professional standards and commitment to them and fair and transparent access to information.
There is still a long way to go. The difference today is that this is a road it is possible to walk down, which is a fundamental transformation that must be built upon with caution and responsibility.
Yasmine Mashaan, member of Syria’s National Commission for Transitional Justice and a co-founder of the Caesar Families Association:
From the perspective of families of the victims, thousands of whom are still fighting to learn the fate of their children, is it even possible to speak about the “victory” of the revolution?
For us, the anniversary of the revolution is not only a dear and precious memory of joy. It always comes with a lump in the throat for our lost loved ones—people we wish could have been with us after the victory. The pain and fatigue many families feel is increased by not knowing the fate of their children. They need to know where and how the path to truth begins, and how justice can be achieved for them. This is only natural, as the reality is not what the victims’ families imagined.
Through my visits and exposure to the experiences of countries around the world—both before and after the liberation—I knew that the road ahead was long. I knew [uncovering the fate of the missing] could not begin immediately after the political transition and liberation, because it requires financial and technical efforts and expertise: forensic personnel, appropriate equipment, the capacity to conduct DNA analysis and investigative expertise.
Has there been any real progress made in the file of the missing and the detainees, or are families still living in the same state of waiting and uncertainty?
We now have a dedicated commission for missing persons [the National Commission for Missing Persons], which is performing its duties to the fullest extent. It has begun collaborating with international bodies, such as the International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP), the UN’s Independent Institution on Missing Persons in the Syrian Arab Republic (IIMP) and the Red Cross, as well as Syrian civil society organizations. One of the most important tasks, currently, is to receive reports of mass graves and work to protect them—an essential step on the path of searching for the truth.
The journey of transitional justice began with formulating action plans. We now have a transitional justice commission, with six directorates that operate in a parallel and integrated manner: the Directorate of Truth, Directorate of Accountability, Directorate of Reparations, Directorate of Memorialization and National Memory, Directorate of Institutional Reform and Directorate of National Reconciliation.
The Directorate of Truth is now drawing up its strategic plan and building its teams, and will soon begin operations in the provinces. Similarly, the Directorate of Accountability has prepared some files to submit to the judiciary, and the Directorate of Reparations has begun its work. We are working on the victim registry, recovery centers and implementing a referral system to mitigate harm to victims. However, all this requires time and effort.
As the victims, we may feel the path is delayed, but proper institutionalization delivers the proper results. We are making every effort to ensure this institutionalization is done correctly, so that the outcome is both sound and satisfactory for the victims.
Transitional justice is not a judiciary and litigation—it is a comprehensive social, economic, political and legal process, and aims to restore Syria’s social cohesion. It works to solve structural problems in society and the existing legal system, which is a long and complex process that goes beyond holding criminals accountable and prosecuting them.
As a woman, and somebody from Deir e-Zor—one of the areas marginalized under the former regime—how do you assess the situation of both women and marginalized areas more than a year after Assad’s fall?
Marginalization continues, or so we feel as people from Deir e-Zor. There are figures who hold sensitive positions in power, but weighed against the scale of destruction and interference the province has been subjected to, there is a sense of discrimination and marginalization. This is not only from the authorities, but even from civil society organizations and institutions that focus only on the major urban centers and forget about the countryside and other areas—as if there were no victims anywhere but Damascus, Reef Dimashq, Aleppo and Idlib!
Deir e-Zor needs more attention and care. The province has been subjected to many occupations, each with a different ideology. Most recently, it was divided into a section controlled by the SDF and another controlled by the Syrian state. This affected people, and the way they interact with us.
We need to strengthen the role of young people and pay more attention to schools and education, because these areas were exposed to [the Islamic State] IS, the SDF, the Assad regime and Shiification, so we need to rebuild society on the right foundations. This means Deir e-Zor must be at the center of the work of the authorities and organizations, because renewed neglect will create more problems.
Part of the transitional justice process is to have a just mechanism to distribute the work of organizations. This effort falls on everyone’s shoulders: from the transitional justice commission to organizations, institutions, media, society and individuals. Everyone has a role in transitional justice, and in rebuilding social justice.
As a woman, I don’t see discrimination at the transitional justice commission, where we are at the heart of the decision-making process. But there is marginalization in other spheres, and it pains me deeply that we still find ourselves needing to prove to the world once again that we are capable of working.
Abdulbasit Sieda, Kurdish writer, politician and former president of the Syrian National Council (SNC):
With the fall of the Assad regime, has the revolution achieved its goals? If not, what has not been achieved?
Syrians initially demanded reform and the abolition of Article 8 of the Constitution [which designated the Baath Party the “leader of state and society”]. The Assad regime met these just demands with bullets and killing, so the uprising became a revolution demanding the overthrow of the regime with all its symbols and pillars, while simultaneously calling for freedom, dignity and justice.
Syrians have gotten rid of the regime, but they are still waiting for transitional justice. They are still waiting for constitutional texts that dispel concerns over freedom and rights, whether for individuals or collectives. They are also waiting for actual measures that enhance mutual trust between all parts of Syrian society and respect individual freedoms and rights regardless of social affiliation or geographic origin. None of this can be brought to fruition without credible, effective institutions that have popular and legal legitimacy.
Moreover, the struggle to make ends meet is eating away at people. Syrians today need the most basic conditions and necessities for a decent life. Slogans and carnivals do not fill anyone’s stomach, and cannot be a solution in a situation where people need practical measures that convince them and meet their needs.
To what extent can it be said that the demands of Syrians—including Kurds in particular—have been fulfilled? What are the main challenges that remain for the Kurdish cause in Syria? Is there a fear of renewed marginalization in the next stage, despite the political changes?
Presidential Decree No. 13 on Kurdish rights is a bold and correct step on the right path, and serves as a suitable foundation for discussing the Kurdish issue and reaching a consensus on a comprehensive solution within the Syrian national framework. But there are risks of regression, due to the efforts of some who are still guided by ideology, not the country’s interest. It is necessary to follow up on the issue and engage in dialogue with Kurdish representatives. The Kurdish issue is more than the SDF, even though it tries to exploit and monopolize it to serve its own agenda and achieve partisan gains within Syrian state institutions.
There is an urgent need for the Syrian Constitution to recognize legitimate Kurdish rights, and the rights of all other Syrian components and citizens, to dispel concerns and reassure everyone. We must do this on the basis of our highest national interests, not just to make the international community happy. A geographically unified and socially cohesive Syria will be strong, able to face internal and external challenges, especially in the context of the US-Israeli war on Iran and its immediate and future consequences for our region and our country, which is in the eye of the storm.
Is the Syrian government and the international community—as a pressure-wielding observer—moving in the right direction when it comes to Syria’s diverse communities, or are we heading towards a sectarian system similar to that in Lebanon?
Confining the Kurdish issue to arrangements with the SDF lays the ground for a system dominated by sectarian leaders, because the SDF leadership and Democratic Union Party [PYD] cadres—along with their backers—may come to see it as their exclusive domain, their property, claiming to act as the sole legitimate representatives of Syria’s Kurds. This is not the reality.
The Kurdish issue must be discussed with the full spectrum of Kurdish representatives, including political forces and social, intellectual and cultural actors. Only then can it be placed in its proper national framework. This is fundamentally a national issue, one that concerns all Syrians. Addressing it fairly will lay the foundation for productive, normal relations among all components of Syrian society across the country.
The same applies to other components of Syria, whether on the coast, in Suwayda or among Christians, Syriac-Assyrians, Turkmen and others.
You previously held a senior leadership position in the political opposition. Based on this experience, if you had the power to decide, what would you consider the most important issues to work on right now?
What is important at this stage is not to confuse the tasks of the interim government with those of an elected government. The current government does not have the authority to usurp the responsibilities and functions of an anticipated elected government.
Expediting a law on political parties and associations, even if by presidential decree, [should be prioritized] given its importance, the nature of the current stage, and the need to prepare for what comes next. [Editor’s note: After the fall of Assad, Syria’s new authorities dissolved all existing political parties.] This falls within the scope of freedom, for which hundreds of thousands of Syrians were martyred.
Highest priority should be given to the cost of living, by adopting quick and realistic solutions. The hungry, the sick, the naked, the homeless cannot wait any longer. This is part of justice, for which Syrians sacrificed during the revolution.
There should be tireless work to facilitate the return of all displaced people and refugees to their homes with dignity and respect, ensuring their basic living necessities.
An inclusive national rhetoric should be adopted in the official media, one that reassures everyone. Abusers who adopt sectarian or ethnic rhetoric as a means of incitement and hatred should be publicly held accountable before a fair judiciary. We must not forget the creative slogan raised by the youth of the revolution in its early days: “One, one, one, the Syrian people are one.”
Mazhar Sharbaji, governance and elections expert and former head of the Darayya City Council:
As the former head of the Darayya City Council, and an expert in local administration, how do you assess the situation of services and infrastructure? Has there been a tangible improvement in people’s lives?
Services are poor in general because of the lack of funds for administrative units and municipalities, which creates a problem with institutional governance. Poor services are also the result of not appointing competent and experienced administrative staff.
We ought to have had genuine representation through real elections—not appointments based on favoritism and trust-building, which do not produce good results in terms of services. People have a reaction to the level of services provided, and this could have been avoided, as happened in many revolutions and experiences before ours, by employing patriotic individuals with expertise and competence.
There is a very high prevalence of violations, coupled with a lack of understanding of the reality of local administration. As I see it, the situation of infrastructure and services is not good, though there is an improvement from what they were at the start of the revolution.
For example, there is an improvement in electricity and water, but infrastructure, services and roads are extremely bad. Services are limited under the current circumstances, a year after liberation, and I think this could have been better if there were real elections and real representation of local councils, administrations and institutions.
How has the conduct of government institutions and local administrations changed since the fall of the regime?
After liberation, we find the working behavior of institutions to be generally unclear. There is chaos due to illogical appointments, and the spread of corruption to some extent by remnants of the former regime who taught the new departments. Corruption is spreading, particularly at banks and financial institutions, as well as some government institutions—but it is informal, or under the table.
Local administrative employees, after the fall of the regime, are good people, but they are not competent or experienced because they were chosen based on trust, patronage, acquaintance or kinship.
There is no full accountability or oversight of these actions and practices. On the other hand, there is a good focus on security and safety, which has become available in the country. Still, services should go hand-in-hand with security success, especially since we have functioning governorates, institutions and municipalities. Over the past months, there has been a significant turnover in heads of municipalities, which indicates the failure of local administrative units.
In your opinion, what are the main challenges to rebuilding local administration in destroyed cities, such as Darayya? What needs to change to ensure more efficient and transparent institutions?
There is a lack of clarity in the vision for the future of destroyed areas, such as Jobar, Darayya, Deir e-Zor—all the destroyed areas. Will they turn towards investment, proper urban planning, or be reconstructed as they were before? Future investments are unclear.
There is a delay in convening the People’s Assembly, which could issue new legislation related to all sectors: education, health, services, local administration, infrastructure, investment. Planners and government officials are lost, and many ministries—with their plans and programs—are waiting for parliament to convene to present the draft laws they have been preparing.
The lack of funding is one of the biggest challenges. The money raised through popular campaigns to fund services were a fiction, and have changed nothing on the ground.
We must rely on expertise and competency, in accordance with the standards of good governance—which is participatory—as well as the rule of law and transparency. But there is no clarity or rule of law, because laws are frozen. There is no participation in decision-making in most cities, not at the level of reconstruction nor at the level of administrative units or municipalities. There is no transparency in tendering and bidding, and there is a lack of oversight and accountability. As a consequence, we observe corruption spreading and beginning to expand.
This piece was originally published in Arabic and translated into English by Mateo Nelson.
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