The case for a US Northeast Asia Command

Click on the banner above to explore the Tiger Project.

To maximize its deterrent and warfighting effectiveness in the Indo-Pacific region, the United States must reform its military command-and-control structure in Northeast Asia. The requirements of this new structure should be evaluated through three distinct lenses: strategic alignment with the recent National Defense Strategy, integration with regional allies, and its impact on the perceptions of potential adversaries.

According to General Xavier Brunson, the senior US military officer assigned to Korea, when China looks at Northeast Asia from its east coast, it views the Korean Peninsula as the “dagger in the heart of Asia.” In this view, Japan serves as an allied backstop—an unsinkable aircraft carrier positioned to project power and prevent adversary ambitions from extending beyond the first island chain. The general’s characterization was controversial in many quarters. It prompted a pointed question from a Chinese delegate at the May 2026 Shangri-la Dialogue in Singapore, while some in South Korea accused the general of trying to “assign” countries to roles in a potential war with China. It is easy to understand why Beijing might portray these comments as threatening, and why some South Koreans and Japanese might fear that the general’s line of thought could drag them into an undesired conflict with China.

However, this perception that US forces could operate from Japan and South Korea, in close coordination with these allies, may be precisely what deters such a conflict by making Beijing hesitant to attack Taiwan. Brunson is not alone in holding the view that China worries about US forces operating from Japan and South Korea. Expert participants in Atlantic Council tabletop exercises have referred to the combined operational power of Japan, South Korea, and the United States fighting together as Beijing’s “nightmare scenario”—one it would actively seek to avoid provoking. However, the current architecture of regional alliances and military command-and-control is far from optimized to turn this “nightmare scenario” into reality.

It is increasingly clear that the United States must revise old paradigms that treated deterrence and defense against China and against North Korea as separate operational challenges. Once considered taboo or outlandish, preparing for simultaneous contingencies is now an increasing focus of discussion among US and allied national security experts. This shift is driven by wargames, tabletop exercises, and analysis exploring the probability that a conflict initiated either by North Korea on the Korean Peninsula or by China in the Taiwan Strait would spread to become a regional conflict involving both.

The crucial takeaway is that the security of Japan and South Korea is inextricably linked, and both are tied to the stability of the entire first island chain, including Taiwan. Driven by this reality, the security architecture of Northeast Asia requires a fundamental transformation. For decades, stability in this area rested on a hub-and-spoke alliance system anchored in separate US bilateral relationships with Japan and South Korea, maintained through a separate US military headquarters in each country. This legacy framework is no longer sufficient for the task.

The Pacific Command (PACOM) is the principal organizing authority for US military operations in the region, managing a vast geographic scope of over thirty countries and roughly half of the globe. In Northeast Asia, PACOM primarily relies on two subordinate headquarters—US Forces Japan (USFJ) and US Forces Korea (USFK, intertwined with the US-South Korea Combined Forces Command or CFC). These headquarters manage alliance military coordination and US military preparations within narrow, constrained boundaries. Consequently, each operates in a separate “stovepipe” with one of the two most powerful allies of the United States in the region. We suggest changing that by establishing an intermediate command echelon in the strategically vital Northeast Asia subregion at a level between PACOM, as the unified combatant command covering a vast region of many countries, and the single-country commands of USFJ and USFK.

Establishing a US Northeast Asia Command (USNEACOM) as a sub-unified command of PACOM with an area of responsibility encompassing Japan, South Korea, and the surrounding areas would reduce structural inefficiencies; better align Operational Control (OPCON) of military forces with the realities of contemporary warfare and regional dynamics; and enable closer strategic, operational, and tactical coordination among US, Japanese, and South Korean forces.

Restructuring command for the tyranny of distance

PACOM faces a dual challenge: the tyranny of distance across a vast area of responsibility and an increasingly competitive strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific region that demands closer allied coordination. The existing sub-unified command structure, largely established in 1957, has not kept pace with rapid regional changes. During the Cold War, both USFJ and USFK operated with distinct and largely non-overlapping missions. Japan functioned primarily as a logistical and rear-area support base, while South Korea served as the front line for a potential Korean Peninsula conflict. This division is no longer sustainable given North Korea’s advanced nuclear and missile capabilities and China’s efforts to coerce and prepare for attacks against the entire first island chain.

Establishing USNEACOM would better align authority and staff resources with responsibility. PACOM’s expansive mandate dilutes its ability to focus on escalation-prone subregions and the most important alliance relationships. Creating USNEACOM would allow operational responsibilities in Northeast Asia to be delegated to a dedicated command. A dedicated sub-unified command would address this imbalance by centralizing operational oversight under a distinct operational theater headquarters with sufficient authority and capability to act decisively and coordinate allied operations primarily with two key and well-resourced US allies within a defined operational theater facing intense threats. Integrating USFJ and USFK into this structure would reduce redundancies and enhance coordination, particularly in scenarios where developments in or related to one country’s theater rapidly affect the other. It would also signal sustained US commitment to two crucial allies in the region, reinforcing credibility and strengthening key relationships.

Historical precedent supports this type of restructuring. During World War II, the United States employed a dual-command system—with Admiral Chester Nimitz commanding the Pacific Ocean areas and General Douglas MacArthur commanding the Southwest Pacific area—to manage US and allied forces across a vast theater of operations in the Pacific that was still smaller than PACOM’s current area of responsibility. This command-and-control structure was put into place—and maintained until the US-led allied victory in the Pacific—following the rapid and catastrophic failure of a hastily created American-British-Dutch-Australian Command (ABDACOM). From 1947 to 1957, in the post-World War II era, Far East Command controlled US forces in Japan and South Korea, providing the US element of the United Nations forces that fought the Korean War. During the Vietnam War, as expanding combat and logistical demands strained existing US command structures, the Department of Defense created the US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. This theater-focused headquarters oversaw both US military operations and multinational coordination, and it was later elevated to the four-star level. Similarly, during ongoing major combat operations in two distinct parts of the US Central Command area of responsibility, separate theater-level commands were established for Afghanistan and Iraq during operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. At their peak, each operated as a four-star sub-unified command with authority over US and multinational forces within their respective countries.

Organizational design considerations for USNEACOM

To successfully realize the USNEACOM concept, military planners must assess three critical factors for structural reform:

1. Enabling trilateral integration for sustainment, intelligence, and operations

Effective deterrence in Northeast Asia extends beyond kinetic capabilities to include geoeconomic resilience, industrial readiness, and technological interoperability. Initiatives such as the proposed Regional Sustainment Hub exemplify this integration by leveraging South Korea’s advanced defense industrial base to support the maintenance, repair, and overhaul of military assets within the theater. This localized approach drastically reduces the logistical constraints of distance while enhancing operational readiness.

Yet, operationalizing these opportunities will encounter institutional and political friction. Regionally, trilateral cooperation among the United States, Japan, and South Korea continues to face large historical obstacles, divergent threat perceptions, and legal constraints stemming from Japan’s pacifist constitutional framework and South Korea’s pursuit of strategic autonomy. Such sensitivities have made deeper trilateral integration politically difficult, even as its operational necessity and value grow.

The creation of USNEACOM could resolve much of the friction inherent in this operational-political paradox. By establishing a single, theater-level US planning and integration layer, USNEACOM would fuse intelligence, logistics, and contingency planning for both Japan and the Korean Peninsula under a unified US operational picture. Rather than forcing a politically sensitive, direct trilateral command structure, existing bilateral alliance channels would remain the primary execution mechanisms. This design bypasses underlying political frictions and the lack of institutionalized defense ties between Japan and South Korea by preserving national sovereignty and respecting national sensitivities while allowing the US sub-unified command to serve as the regional integrator for both operational planning and geoeconomic sustainment.

2. Building a regional kill web via multidomain task force orchestration

A core element of USNEACOM would be the ongoing development and deployment of Army Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTF) in the region. These would include long-range precision fires; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; time-sensitive targeting; and command-and-control capabilities to allow the MDTF to detect and orchestrate strikes against targets over vast areas. Operating across the strategic triangle that can directly influence a Taiwan contingency, these formations include a rotational MDTF in the Philippines, a developing MDTF in Japan, and plans for a combined US-South Korea MDTF. Designed to bridge the gap between low-level provocations and large-scale conflict, MDTFs integrate capabilities across domains into a unified operational framework ahead of a crisis. Since a military crisis or conflict with China, such as a  Taiwan contingency, would likely spill across political boundaries, the region requires a more robust operational architecture with a regional kill web.

A US Northeast Asia sub-unified command would serve as the critical theater-strategic node to orchestrate this distributed lethality. Networking these distributed forces through a sub-unified command would allow the US and allied forces to share real-time sensor data, dynamically re-task long-range fires across geographic locations with varying support relationships, and execute synchronized cyber and space effects.

3. Securing the information high ground through multilateral readiness

Modern military doctrine increasingly recognizes that the next major conflict may be won or lost in the information space. True deterrence requires more than merely possessing capabilities; it demands that US strength, allied integration, and the certainty of a combined response are inescapable and visible realities for potential adversaries. Recent strategic analyses of the Indo-Pacific region underscore this imperative, noting that the operational narrative is just as vital as tactical execution. Because adversaries continuously deploy targeted disinformation to fracture alliance cohesion and sow doubt, the US and its partners must prioritize operations that leverage transparency to project an unbreakable cognitive front.

Importantly, cognitive influence across the Indo-Pacific is fundamentally decentralized. Because it is shaped by partners with their own sovereign interests, threat perception, and complex localized media ecosystems, this is highly unlikely to be controlled from a single centralized node. However, while USNEACOM could not centralize all regional narratives, it could serve as the leader in directing high-impact, combined military activities that carry these critical deterrent messages directly to potential adversaries.

Cognitive deterrence is actively forged and broadcast through complex multination exercises such as Freedom Edge. By bringing together US, Japanese, and South Korean forces for high-end, multidomain operations—encompassing ballistic missile defense, anti-submarine warfare, and integrated cyber defense—these events achieve more than tactical interoperability. They serve as a physical manifestation of allied resolve and the military potential of the trilateral partnership.

USNEACOM and transforming wartime operational control for South Korea and Japan

While Japan and South Korea are both undergoing historic transformations in their wartime operational control and alignment with US forces, they face fundamentally different baseline challenges. USNEACOM can enable the success of both.

The Korean Peninsula remains the strategic focal point of Northeast Asia. Although South Korea has developed a highly capable military and increasingly asserts its need for strategic autonomy, it lacks independent wartime command control arrangements. Efforts to integrate Seoul into a broader regional command structure are complicated by this drive for autonomy and by the planned transition of wartime OPCON—a framework where a South Korean commander will assume primary responsibility for the nation’s defense. As of this publication, both the United States and South Korea aim to complete this transition by 2029.

In this post-transition structure, a South Korean four-star commander will direct a combined bilateral campaign to defend South Korea, integrating forces and setting operational priorities across domains. However, Washington will retain sovereign authority over force employment and escalation-sensitive capabilities, including long-range strike systems, missile defense architecture, space and cyber enablers, and high-end intelligence assets. While these capabilities may be allocated to theater operations, their deployment remains subject to US national command decisions. Ultimately, this is a structural consequence of coalition warfare between sovereign states: Operational authority can be delegated, but escalation authority is rarely transferred. This also reflects a foundational reality of modern coalition warfare doctrine—as seen in counter-ISIS campaigns in Iraq and Syria—where operationally integrated forces maintain distinct national command authorities.

Therefore, following the OPCON transition, alliance operations to defend South Korea would be orchestrated by the CFC under a South Korean commander, yet enabled by the continued presence of USFK and the backing of USFJ under the broader authority of USNEACOM. The US chain of command could exercise authority over US forces as needed from bases in both South Korea and Japan, ensuring that they can operate beyond the strict confines of their host country areas.

The transformation of USFJ is also central to the USNEACOM concept. USFJ has historically functioned as an administrative headquarters focused on alliance management. Nevertheless, the United States and Japan have been upgrading their command-and-control frameworks since 2024. USFJ is transitioning into a Joint Force Headquarters with the authority to command forces across multiple domains. This shift parallels Japan’s establishment of its own Joint Operations Command to enable seamless, cross-domain operations, Japan’s version of multidomain operations. Under the new framework, USFJ will exercise operational control over US service components in Japan, enhancing interoperability and responsiveness. However, there is no plan or policy basis to develop a structure like CFC. Instead, to project combined capability, deter regional adversaries, and ensure wartime readiness, these sovereign command structures must be linked by a unified, distributed command-and-control network, which USNEACOM can help provide.

The imperative for structural reforms

The adaptation of command architecture in Northeast Asia is not one of institutional preference but of urgent strategic mandate. Modern wargames, exercises, and strategic analyses demand a clear-eyed assessment of our current posture. Is a fragmented, siloed, hub-and-spoke command structure truly how we intend to fight a hyper-synchronized, multidomain conflict in the Indo-Pacific region where we are reliant on multinational military coordination? If China’s “nightmare scenario” is a fight with US and allied forces operating simultaneously from South Korea and Japan as a dagger and a shield, then shouldn’t we have a single military command focused on making that nightmare a deterrent reality?

USNEACOM would serve as the forcing function required to align strategic intent with operational implementation. The question is not whether the command structure in the first island chain must change but when. If the US and its allies have to fight in Northeast Asia, they will need this USNEACOM or something very much like it. Historically, the United States has waited until the crucible of combat—often after clear command-and-control failures in the initial battles like that of ABDACOM—to hastily reorganize for the reality of the conflict. We have neither the luxury of time nor distance if we want to achieve peace through strength with a strong denial defense in the first island chain. The US military must decide whether to forge the necessary operational framework now to reinforce US-led deterrence and readiness or risk being forced to build it from the ashes of a sudden crisis.

About the authors

Colonel Christopher Lee is an Indo-Pacific foreign area officer for US Forces Korea.

Lieutenant Colonel Ben Blane is a field artillery officer experienced with multidomain formations in the Indo-Pacific. He is also a research fellow with the Modern War Institute.

Markus Garlauskas is the director of the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He served at the headquarters of Combined Forces Command and US Forces Korea for twelve years, including five years as the director of its strategy division.

The Tiger Project, an Atlantic Council effort, develops new insights and actionable recommendations for the United States, as well as its allies and partners, to deter and counter aggression in the Indo-Pacific. Explore our collection of work, including expert commentary, multimedia content, and in-depth analysis, on strategic defense and deterrence issues in the region.

Related content

Explore the program

The Indo-Pacific Security Initiative (IPSI) informs and shapes the strategies, plans, and policies of the United States and its allies and partners to address the most important rising security challenges in the Indo-Pacific, including China’s growing threat to the international order and North Korea’s destabilizing nuclear weapons advancements. IPSI produces innovative analysis, conducts tabletop exercises, hosts public and private convenings, and engages with US, allied, and partner governments, militaries, media, other key private and public-sector stakeholders, and publics.