The Politicization of the U.S. Military Did Not Start With Trump

These developments have understandably raised serious concerns. Once the military becomes another instrument of partisan conflict, Americans will find it far more difficult to trust government officials when they see troops deployed in dangerous situations. They will struggle to hear from military leaders without questioning the political motives behind their statements. And they may increasingly wonder whether the use of lethal force—abroad or even at home—is being shaped, at least in part, to improve one party’s prospects on Election Day.

The deeper problem, however, is not new—and that makes it all the more troubling. The long-standing tensions between partisan politics and the military reveal just how volatile of a situation Trump is creating. A key turning point in the politicization of the military came in 1951, when U.S. forces were fighting in Korea and a major controversy erupted after a public clash between President Harry Truman and Gen. Douglas MacArthur, the commander of the United Nations Command.

The tensions began in 1949, when China fell to communism. Republicans blamed Truman, who had become president when Franklin D. Roosevelt died in office in April 1945 and had been reelected in 1948, for the rise of a second communist superpower. They argued that the administration had withdrawn crucial support from Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalist government in the months leading up to its collapse. “Who lost China?” quickly became Republicans’ rallying cry; their answer was Truman and his secretary of state, Dean Acheson.

After the United States sent troops to Asia following North Korea crossing the 38th parallel on June 25, 1950, the nation found itself in the midst of another major conflict. In early July, Truman appointed MacArthur, a highly decorated commander who had played a pivotal role in the Pacific during World War II and oversaw the subsequent occupation and reconstruction of Japan. Unlike in World War I or World War II, Truman based his decision to deploy troops to Korea on a series of United Nations Security Council resolutions rather than seeking a formal declaration of war from Congress.

MacArthur was a formidable presence, known for his high regard for his own judgment, and for expecting everyone around him to follow his commands. He was also a master of public relations, adept at using the media to enhance his reputation and advance his objectives.

In August 1950, U.S. News and World Report published a story claiming that the president had stopped MacArthur from sending a statement to the Veterans of Foreign Wars convention that urged the administration to bolster support for Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalists in Formosa (Taiwan) against the communists. It would have contradicted Truman’s pledge to remain neutral over control of the island, and he feared the statement would undermine Korean War negotiations.

Initially, MacArthur’s forces had succeeded in driving back the North Koreans. But once China entered the conflict in October, progress slowed.

Truman met with MacArthur on Wake Island in mid-October 1950 in an attempt to smooth increasingly strained relations and improve the president’s sagging polls. During the private conversation, MacArthur apologized for the statement that U.S. News and World Report published. Even so, the meeting was tense.

After a major Chinese offensive in late November, U.N. troops were forced to retreat, and MacArthur’s confident prediction that the war would be over by December was no longer credible.

The stalemate in Korea, alongside the “Who lost China?” controversy, became a central issue for Republicans in their midterm campaigns. As a result, they—and southern Democrats—expanded their political strength in the midterm elections.

In late November and early December, MacArthur released a communique and told reporters that the president’s refusal to authorize a direct attack on communist China—or to even consider using atomic weapons in North Korea—had placed an “enormous handicap” on his forces. Livid, Truman vented to advisors that the general was an “egotist.”

In 1951, the relationship between Truman and MacArthur worsened. As the stalemate in Korea persisted and an effort to reach a peace agreement with the Chinese collapsed in March, MacArthur issued a statement threatening China right as Truman was trying to negotiate a peace deal.  In a communique on March 24, MacArthur threatened the Chinese, though he also said he was ready to “at any time” to meet with them to negotiate. “All Truman’s careful preparations of a cease-fire proposal,” Truman biographer David McCullough wrote, “were now in vain. MacArthur had cut the ground out from under him.” Truman was thinking about when Abraham Lincoln relieved Gen. George McClellan of his command when he ignored the president.

This prompted speculation overseas about who actually held authority in the United States. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized that MacArthur was creating problems, but they were unsure how to respond; any indication that they had lost confidence in him risked undermining military operations.

After the Joint Chiefs decided to let the controversy pass, things escalated quickly. On April 5, House Minority Leader Joseph W. Martin Jr. released to the press a letter from MacArthur in which he again charged that Truman was endangering U.S. soldiers and obstructing a resolution to the conflict. He wanted the president to allow him to attack China. “[I]f we lose the war to communism in Asia,” MacArthur wrote, “the fall of Europe is inevitable, win in and Europe most probably would avoid war and yet preserve freedom. … There is no substitute for victory.”

Reading this information left Truman, whose approval ratings were below 30 percent, at the end of his rope. “MacArthur shoots another political bomb,” he wrote in his diary. “This looks like the last straw. Rank insubordination.” His top advisors, including Secretary of State Acheson and Joint Chiefs Chairman Omar Bradley, agreed that MacArthur should be relieved of his command.

On April 11, amid fears that MacArthur might resign first and seize control of the narrative, Truman announced on the radio that the general would be stepping down from his post. He explained that military leaders needed to understand that they were obligated to follow orders issued through constitutional chain of authority, which started in the Oval Office.

With Democrats on the defensive, burdened by the “police action” in Korea, fears of inflation, and persistent Republican accusations that the administration was failing to root out communist spies in the federal government, the GOP pounced. Truman described the political reaction as “quite an explosion” in his diary. Wisconsin Sen. Joseph McCarthy, the leading figure of the Second Red Scare, and Ohio Sen. Robert Taft (both Republicans) called for Truman’s impeachment. House Republicans invited MacArthur to speak to a joint session of Congress—an invitation Martin made without speaking with the Democrats.

Polls and letters made clear to the White House that it faced a serious problem: MacArthur was extremely popular. Although Truman brushed off attacks directed at him, and the Pentagon stood by the president, Americans were captivated by the returning war hero. Thirty million people watched MacArthur as he addressed Congress on April 19, warning of the dangers of appeasement and questioning why the president did not allow him to use the all of America’s might. “War’s very object is victory,” he said, “not prolonged indecision.” Bars were packed, students saw it in their classes, and other families listened on the radio at home.

He closed the speech with a line from an old military song: “‘Old soldiers never die; they just fade away.’ And like the old soldier of that ballad, I now close my military career and just fade away—an old soldier who tried to do his duty as God gave him the light to see that duty. Good-bye.” He was greeted by a crowd of 250,000 in Washington, and the next day New York hosted massive ticker tape parade in his honor.

Truman wrote that the speech was “a bunch of damn bullshit.” Even so, the Republican attacks further damaged his standing with the public. The MacArthur controversy finally began to cool when Georgia Sen. Richard Russell, a Democrat who chaired the Armed Services Committee, convened closed door hearings in which he grilled the general for disregarding constitutional procedures. Russell persuaded many conservative Democrats to break with MacArthur, leaving only a small number still in his corner.

Though the MacArthur scandal faded, the political damage did not. This episode, showcasing how the military would be a weaponized tool for partisan purposes in the Cold War, helped pave the way for 1952, when Dwight Eisenhower became the first Republican elected to the presidency since 1932 and Republicans regained control of Congress for only the second time since 1930.

The MacArthur controversy also became a foundational element in the GOP’s long-term argument that Democrats were “weak on defense,” a charge that has lingered to this day despite the fact that a Democratic president—Franklin Roosevelt—led the World War II mobilization and defeated fascism.

While Americans often indulge in nostalgia about a military that has remained above the fray of party politics, the historical reality is quite different. Since 1951, the parties have repeatedly clashed over how best to support the armed forces, with Republicans frequently using their claimed superior commitment to the military as evidence that voters should trust them more than Democrats on questions of national security. But these arguments are rooted in an explicit political strategy, just as they were in 1952, when Republicans sought to capitalize on the tensions between Truman and MacArthur to clear a path toward victory.

History keeps repeating itself. The dangers posed by episodes remain very real. Each time the military becomes a tool in the ongoing—and intensifying—conflicts between Democrats and Republicans, the soldiers who risk their lives to defend the country lose some of their standing in the eyes of voters. At the same time, voters lose more of their trust in the ability to believe that decisions about war and peace are being made based on what best serves the national interest.