Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping continue to pose significant threats to global shipping and maritime security.1 While the terms are frequently used synonymously, differentiation is crucial. According to the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), piracy is defined as "any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends […] (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft [or] (ii) in a place outside the jurisdiction of any state." Armed robbery against ships encompasses "any illegal act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of piracy, committed for private ends and directed against a ship or against persons or property on board such a ship, within a state's internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea".2
In recent decades, piracy incidents, especially off the Horn of Africa, reached high levels, impairing regional shipping and trade from the early 2000s onward. Despite initial containment by joint international efforts, maritime security issues have increasingly drawn attention to the Gulf of Guinea. The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) Piracy Reporting Centre noted an increase from 162 incidents in 2019 to 195 in 2020, with the majority occurring in the Gulf of Guinea. In 2020 alone, 135 crew members were kidnapped in 22 separate incidents, with 95% of these kidnappings happening in the Gulf. Notably, reported incidents have declined within the following years, only to increase again in 2023 in the Gulf of Guinea. As overall numbers are constant (115 incidents in 2022, 120 incidents in 2023, 116 incidents in 2024), piracy and armed robbery remain relevant maritime security issues on a global scale. The numbers for the Gulf of Guinea developed from the high of 81 in 2020 towards 35 in 2021, 19 in 2022, 22 in 2023 and 18 incidents reported in 2024, marking a stark decrease within five years. In the past, however, international shipping companies and security analysts have raised alarms over the increasing number of incidents. These concerns led to significant actions, such as the deployment of a Royal Danish Navy frigate to the region in November 2021. However, relying solely on "piracy counting" and the "politics of numbers" to assess maritime security remain misleading. Given its multifaceted nature, addressing maritime security requires more comprehensive measures, including capacity building, training, and advising local security forces.3 These efforts involve both local and external stakeholders and are complemented by a coordinated, though voluntary, EU-Gulf of Guinea strategy and action plan. With a growing emphasis on local ownership in security policies, it raises the question of whether actors such as the European Union can or should play a long-term, sustainable role in the region.
IMB Director Michael Howlett recently highlighted concerns about the Gulf of Guinea, noting an uptick in maritime security incidents. Howlett emphasized the importance of regional ownership in safeguarding shipping and trade to counter criminal activities. Rather than simply combating piracy to stabilize Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) without a comprehensive plan, European nations and the European Union could assist littoral states in developing sustainable strategies to curb piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea. The maritime sector, inherently suited for international cooperation, could benefit significantly from a broad Maritime Security Sector Reform that leverages local ownership and the existing Yaoundé architecture.
Maritime Security and Maritime Security Sector Reform
Security Sector Reform (SSR) has become increasingly important in international development assistance, policy-making, and academic circles since the late 1990s. SSR involves creating a security governance framework that adheres to democratic norms, legitimate civilian oversight, and transparent, accountable practices. A critical element of SSR is establishing a civilian oversight function over key national security institutions. Because SSR extends beyond mere technical assistance to encompass control over the use of force, a core aspect of national sovereignty, it is fundamentally political.4
Maritime Security Sector Reform (MSSR) aims to enhance the governance capabilities of coastal states. This initiative requires a whole-of-government approach, especially focusing on ministries handling security, economic, financial, and judicial matters due to their interrelated duties.5 Key actions include developing or updating codes and protocols related to maritime security and law to equip enforcement agencies effectively. Additionally, creating knowledge resources for bureaucratic staff, establishing legitimate civilian oversight, and ensuring accountability and transparency are essential to achieving effective governance and institutional performance.
In addition to strengthening institutions, traditional capacity-building measures such as providing equipment and professional training are crucial to enable security forces to respond effectively and protect maritime interests.6 However, focusing solely on enhancing security capabilities does not constitute a comprehensive MSSR or SSR, as it does not fully strengthen governmental capacities across all governance areas, but rather falls under traditional security assistance. This holistic model necessitates including a broad range of state and non-state actors to foster ongoing interdisciplinary and cross-departmental dialogue. Successful cooperation relies on consensus and ensures that agreed-upon rules are consistently enforced.7
Reforms in a country's maritime security sector can be initiated by external organizations like the United Nations or ECOWAS, but the actual implementation and sustainability of these reforms depend on local actors. Consequently, Security Sector Reform should primarily be a local endeavor. Therefore, MSSR is not a checklist exercise but must be precisely tailored to fit the specific local and regional conditions, accurately reflecting realities on the ground.8 This principle of local ownership finds successful application in the Western Indian Ocean, where Alexandre demonstrates how the region evolved from externally-driven responses to African-led frameworks through the Regional Maritime Security Architecture (RMSA), illustrating how regional actors can reclaim agency in maritime governance.
MSSR as a Comprehensive Approach
Initially, piracy incidents off the Horn of Africa were mitigated through significant naval interventions, including active anti-piracy operations and the deployment of armed private security contractors aboard civilian ships. Key operations such as NATO's Operation Ocean Shield (2009-2016), the European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) Somalia (since 2008), and the multinational Combined Task Force 151 (since 2009) played crucial roles. According to Dirk Siebels, these efforts were largely successful due to "unprecedented cooperation between naval forces and the shipping industry, as well as self-protection measures of merchant vessels, including the use of privately contracted armed security personnel." This collaboration effectively reduced piracy and kept major shipping lanes open. However, these successes were mainly addressing the symptoms of deeper issues in Somalia, then considered a failed state. The ongoing issue of illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing by trawlers off the Somali coast has exacerbated unemployment and corruption, complicating efforts to end piracy, according to Percy and Shortland.9
Overall, fragile states and poor governance typically encourage piracy, smuggling, and IUU fishing. Areas with weak or no governmental control often become safe havens and operational bases for organized crime and piracy. Thus, addressing blue crime, piracy, and maritime insecurity effectively requires tackling the underlying problems of weak statehood in coastal states.
The conditions in the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Guinea also differ significantly. The SLOCs crossing the Gulf of Guinea, while considered less critical on a global scale than those off the Horn of Africa, still play a vital role in local and African-European trade and should not be overlooked. Furthermore, while Somalia has transitioned from a failing to a failed state, and now to a fragile state, the Gulf of Guinea features several stable countries, though some face domestic security and stability issues. Comprehensive Maritime Security Sector Reform (MSSR) is a beneficial approach to address not just piracy but also further maritime insecurities like smuggling, marine pollution, and primarily IUU- fishing. This approach involves incorporating the needs and issues of littoral countries to address the broader spectrum of security challenges.10
In African waters, as Bueger accurately advises, "many nations need support in providing maritime security, while not undermining their sovereignty and regional integration processes." Initiatives within the MSSR framework in the Gulf of Guinea must hence be seamlessly integrated with existing local efforts, such as the Nigerian Deep Blue project and Ghana's National Integrated Maritime Strategy. These initiatives should extend beyond basic security assistance to include cooperation with regional economic communities, avoiding duplication of efforts or the creation of isolated structures. They should also promote international collaboration in the region and with external partners, leveraging frameworks like the African Union Security Sector Policy Framework, the Yaoundé Code of Conduct, and the Gulf of Guinea Declaration on Suppression of Piracy. In the words of Vice Admiral Ignacio Villanueva Serrano, Operation Commander, EU NAVFOR Atalanta, on the role of non-African states in regional maritime security: "Effective maritime security hinges on collaboration between non-African and African stakeholders, harmonizing external expertise with regional ownership." These measures aim to minimize complications and disputes from cooperation efforts. The European Union's Coordinated Maritime Presence in the Gulf of Guinea serves as a foundation for enhancing maritime security cooperation under the Yaoundé architecture.
What future course to follow?
Maritime security threats extend beyond territorial waters and national borders. Thus, intensified regional cooperation is essential for addressing insecurities in the Gulf of Guinea and surrounding areas. External actors like the European Union and its national naval units could lend their expertise in coordinating efforts, and offer training and capacity-building in maritime security and anti-piracy measures. However, such measures alone are insufficient to address the range of maritime insecurities, including piracy, armed robbery, IUU fishing, smuggling, and marine pollution. A comprehensive approach is necessary for sustained success. MSSR can significantly contribute to the gradual and enduring establishment of good governance in maritime affairs, ideally fostering the development of a robust security framework tailored to ocean governance.
A major challenge in securing the Gulf of Guinea lies not just in suppressing piracy and armed robbery but also in facilitating political negotiations and establishing firm cooperation among key African stakeholders. These include the littoral states, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the European Union, which plays a supportive role in implementing sustained political reforms. The EU should seek close collaboration with local actors, stakeholders, and experts to effectively address these issues. As the region often adopts "emergency measures or policies […] to respond to the threat to the interests of external actors," such as piracy,11 external interventions should instead bolster regional leadership and local ownership. Such support could be organized through coordinated MSSR efforts and continued naval initiatives like the EU's Coordinated Maritime Presence, aiming to foster a more stable maritime environment. The importance of this shift toward regional ownership is underscored by successful examples elsewhere in African maritime spaces. Alexandre highlights how the Western Indian Ocean transformed from fragmented responses to comprehensive African-led frameworks, demonstrating how coastal states can move from "passive observers" to active stakeholders who shape maritime governance through "soft power" approaches.
Yet, it remains to be seen whether European naval capabilities can sustain another continuous deployment in non-European waters. Maritime Security Sector Reform might thus serve as a practical solution for enhancing maritime safety, implemented in collaboration with local actors and supported by experienced external stakeholders. Furthermore, considering the "collapse of Western influence in West Africa," the approach should balance local "African ownership" with ongoing concerns for maritime security and maintaining long-term partnerships in the region. Since "maritime security remains a global responsibility," the EU regards maintaining stability in the Gulf of Guinea as essential for its security interests.
1. Jacobsen, Katja Lindskov (2022): The Politics of Piracy Numbers: The Gulf of Guinea Case, in: Ruxandra-Laura, Bosilca/ Ferreira, Susana/Ryan, Barry J. (eds.): Routledge Handbook of Maritime Security, Routledge: London, 127-138.
2. IMO Resolution A.1025 (26) "Code of Practice for the Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships".
3. Christian Bueger and colleagues define maritime security as an "umbrella term" covering four main areas: national security, the marine environment, economic development, and human security. These areas are closely interconnected and impact one another significantly. This broad and holistic perspective on security emphasizes "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want," paving the way for a comprehensive approach to security that leads to Security Sector Reform (SSR). See Bueger, Christian/Edmunds, Timothy/Ryan, Barry J. (2019): Maritime security: The uncharted politics of the global sea, in: International Affairs 95, no. 5, pp. 971-978; Bueger, Christian/Edmunds, Timothy (2017): Beyond Seablindness: A new Agenda for Maritime Security Studies, in International Affairs 93, no. 6, pp. 1293-1311; Hough, Peter (2013): Understanding Global Security, Routledge: London. pp. 9f.
4. Schroeder, Ursula C./Chappuis, Fairlie/Kocak, Deniz (2014): Security Sector Reform and the Emergence of Hybrid Security Governance, in International Peacekeeping 21, no.2, pp. 214-230.
5. Sandoz, John F. (2012): Maritime Security Sector Reform, USIP Special Report 306. Washington, D.C.
7. Schroeder, Ursula C./Chappuis, Fairlie/Kocak, Deniz (2014): Security Sector Reform and the Emergence of Hybrid Security Governance, in International Peacekeeping 21, no.2, pp. 214-230; Albrecht, Peter/Stepputat, Finn/Andersen, Louise (2010): Security sector reform, the European way, in: Sedra, Mark (ed.), The future of security sector reform, Centre for International Governance (CIGI): Waterloo, pp. 74-87.
8. Donais, Timothy (2008): Understanding Local Ownership in Security Sector Reform, in: Donais, Timothy (ed.), Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform, Lit: Münster, pp. 3-17; Nathan, Laurie (2008): The challenge of local ownership of SSR: From donor rhetoric to practice, in: Donais, Timothy (ed.), Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform, Lit: Münster, pp. 19-36.
9. Percy, Sarah/Shortland, Anja (2013): Contemporary Maritime Piracy: Five Obstacles to Ending Somali Piracy, Global Policy, 4: 65-72.
10. Siebels, Dirk (2018): Ships, guns, and laws. Threats to shipping in the Gulf of Guinea and potential countermeasures, Risk Intelligence Presentation, May 2018.
11. Iheduru, Okechukwu (2023): Hybrid Maritime Security Governance and Limited Statehood in the Gulf of Guinea: A Nigerian Case Study, in: Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Vol 22, 3, p. 148.
