Since the beginning of the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran, a key question constantly asked is how Beijing might react — assuming that China’s economy relies on oil imported from Iran and shipped through the Strait of Hormuz.
In reality, however, China is 85 percent energy self-sufficient. While China imports more than 10 percent of its global oil total from Iran, its energy supply has long been diversified internationally and electrified domestically to avoid critical dependence on any single source. Beijing has built a cushion against a short-term supply shock from a war in the Middle East. However, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, if prolonged beyond three months, will pose a serious test to China’s longtime assumption about unsustainable oil supply disruptions driven by a major regional conflict.
China’s Oil Dependence on the Middle East
China’s oil imports hit record highs in 2025 at 11.55 million barrels per day. Over 55 percent of imports come from the Middle East: Saudi Arabia (14.9 percent), Iran (13 percent), Iraq (11.2 percent), United Arab Emirates (6.4 percent), Oman (6.1 percent), Kuwait (3.3 percent), and Qatar (1.3 percent). With the exception of Oman, most of this oil must be shipped through the Strait of Hormuz. According to the Chinese government, slightly more than 70 percent of the country’s crude oil consumption depends on import, so 38 percent of Chinese oil consumption depends on imports from the Middle East.
Beijing has not disclosed its oil imported from Iran since 2022, so data only comes from third parties and can be opaque. Iranian oil is transshipped through countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia before reaching China. Iran and China engage in oil for infrastructure arrangements to obfuscate payments. Multiple Chinese and Western sources estimate that approximately 90 percent of Iran’s crude oil exports end up in China. Kpler’s figure of 1.38 million barrels per day is widely cited for China’s imports of Iranian oil in 2025, including by Reuters, South China Morning Post, and The Diplomat. Federal Reserve Economic Data/International Monetary Fund data indicated Iran’s total crude oil exports in 2025 averaged 1.55 million barrels per day, so the 1.38 million figure squares with the 90 percent estimate.
The war in Iran has three direct impacts on China’s oil security. First, the oil production and export from Iran are inevitably disrupted in the short term, and the timing of their resumption remains unclear. Second, Iran has threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz. As of March 15, there have been 16 confirmed attacks on ships in and around the Gulf, effectively cutting off the flow of oil. Third, Iran’s strikes and the closure of the strait have led Gulf producers to cut oil production. As of March 8, oil prices have surged to over $100 per barrel for the first time in four years. Since then, it has been lingering around $90. All three impacts will directly affect China.
Is China Energy Insecure?
China’s dependence on imported oil does not have a profound effect on its energy security. If anything, it only reflects risks in one category of the country’s energy demand.
China is, in fact, highly self-sufficient in terms of energy supply. According to People’s Daily, during the 14th Five Year Plan from 2021 to 2025, China’s energy self-sufficiency had consistently been above 80 percent. As a senior executive at China National Petroleum Corporation (China’s largest oil company) asserted in July 2025, the actual level of China’s energy self-sufficiency is as high as 85 percent. Coal remains the primary component of China’s energy sector: around 51.4 percent of China’s total energy consumption. Renewable energy sources surpassed oil in 2024 to become the second largest source of energy in China.
China’s high level of self-reliance puts its oil dependence in perspective. While we discuss China’s 70 percent dependence on imported crude oil and 55 percent of its global oil imports originating from the Middle East, it is a much smaller portion of China’s overall energy pie chart when coal, solar, wind, and nuclear power are all taken into consideration. As the math goes, 38 percent of China’s total oil consumed comes from the Middle East, but oil itself is less than 20 percent of China’s total energy consumption. China also produces about 30 percent of the crude oil it consumes domestically: 215 million tons among the 765 million tons needed in 2025.
Chart made by author. According to the National Bureau of Statistics, coal made up 51.4 percent of total energy consumption in 2025 and “clean energy” accounted for 30.4 percent, including natural gas. That leaves oil at 18.2 percent.
Most importantly, the Chinese economy is moving rapidly away from fossil fuels and toward new renewable energy sources. In 2025, renewable energy — including nuclear — surpassed oil as the second largest energy source, totaling more than 20 percent of China’s total energy consumed. China’s economy is rapidly electrifying, adding more hydro, nuclear, solar, and wind power generation every year. China’s energy insecurity due to imported oil has been greatly alleviated as a result of this electrification campaign. The decrease in demand for oil has become a trend, and it will only accelerate down the road.
Having said that, the role oil plays in the Chinese economy remains irreplaceable, even though it is no longer essential for China’s energy security. While vehicle electrification reduces dependence on gasoline, China still relies on oil for jet fuel, shipping, diesel fuel for medium- and heavy-duty vehicles, and petrochemicals. These demands will remain, albeit lessened, even if electrification continues. As China’s demand for petrochemicals increases with its technological advancement, oil will remain a key contributor to China’s future economic growth.
Another factor that contributes to China’s energy security is that its oil supply is highly diversified — a stated policy of the Chinese government. The largest share of China’s oil imports in 2025 belongs to Russia at 17.4 percent, followed by Saudi Arabia at 14.9 percent. Chinese analysts have maintained throughout the years that China would not let any country dominate more than 15 percent of its oil imports. The only exception has been Russia, which China sees as an indispensable partner in a shared great power competition with the United States.
The Real Test for China
With its limited but real dependence on Middle Eastern oil, China faces two challenges in any regional security crisis: the disruption of production and the disruption of shipment. The diversification of oil suppliers and the electrification of the Chinese economy are the top counterstrategies Beijing has pursued to reduce risk. These steps have seen some success.
However, coming to the real risks China faces regarding its oil dependence, Beijing’s theory has been surprisingly underwhelming. Middle East specialists and oil executives consistently argue that China’s oil security is susceptible — but not vulnerable — to risk. Their fundamental belief is that an energy crisis caused by a regional conflict in the Middle East will not be sustainable: The war may drag on, but oil will most likely have to be let through. In the Chinese view, a prolonged shutdown of the Strait of Hormuz — assuming Iran is capable of such an action — will trigger a global energy crisis and jeopardize the interests of both regional producers and global consumers alike. In that scenario, China anticipates that all parties to the conflict, including the United States, will be forced to eventually climb down the escalation ladder and seek a negotiated settlement. Such a crisis, therefore, will be resolved by collective grievances creating a collective solution. China has dispatched its Special Envoy for Middle Eastern Affairs, Zhai Jun, to the region for shuttle diplomacy. It is conceivable that China will coalesce positions for a potential ceasefire with countries in the region.
For years, while vigorously cutting back its energy dependence on Middle Eastern oil, China has couched its contingency planning on the assumption that a major regional conflict in the Middle East will neither be likely nor sustainable. Chinese interlocutors have consistently denied the need for China to develop a military presence in the region, citing the improbability of a total loss of China’s energy access there.
If the closure of the strait lasts for months — placing China’s oil imports under stress — Beijing may be pushed to take action. China will be more likely to align positions with major oil consumers and producers, exerting pressure on Washington for a ceasefire to seek restoration of shipments through the strait. That proposal could potentially be popular with the rest of the world. If the United States has not achieved its desired outcome — which has not been publicly disclosed — in the war by then, it will face mounting pressure to ease tensions with Iran.
The impact of the Iran war on China’s oil dependence is highly nuanced. China imports more than 10 percent of its global total from Iran, but China’s energy consumption has long been diversified internationally and electrified domestically to avoid critical dependence on any single exporter. China has couched its confidence in the energy supply from the Middle East on the perceived unsustainable nature of a major conflict. That assumption is now being put to a real test.
Yun Sun, Ph.D., is the director of the China program at the Stimson Center. She specializes in Chinese foreign policy.
Image: NAVCENT Public Affairs via Wikimedia Commons
