Europe and its partners need to face up to Trump’s desertion from NATO and to think outside the box to address damage-management challenges.
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In recent weeks, I have had various engagements with former members of the UK defense establishment, former ministers, and think tankers close to the UK defense establishment discussing the state of the Special Relationship with the US, and particularly where it relates to defense.
Now, herein, critics, or realists (including yours truly), would suggest that the special relationship and NATO itself are dead, or, if not, on life support. This follows stinging criticism by the US of perennial underspending on defense by NATO partners, and of them failing to be there at the US’s hours of need, and particularly now in the US-Israeli war on Iran.
From a European perspective, there is also frustration at the US not appearing to take European interests seriously, as seen by the US scaling back and now charging for the support it gives to Ukraine, and then Donald Trump’s threats to take other NATO members’ territory – specifically Greenland from Denmark, and even Canada. They would argue that allies do not threaten the use of force or coercion to take territory from their allies.
For many non-US NATO members, the charge that they have not been there for the US is particularly galling after many shed much blood and much treasure after 911 in supporting failed US interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the case of the UK, the fact that it spent so much on those failed wars can, to an extent, explain the dire state of UK defense’s now – I would add disastrous risk assessment and long-term defense planning, procurement, and over-ambitious defense goals.
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Against this backdrop, I was surprised to still hear the UK defense establishment adopt a rosy, or glass-half-full, view of the UK-US defense relationship. The message seems to be that the UK-US special relationship runs deep, as it was forged in blood on numerous battlefields over the past century or so, and will outlast the short-term travails of the current Trump presidency.
A similar line was presented over the outlook for NATO – it’s not dead yet, and let’s bunker down until the next US presidency, when surely the advantages of NATO, as they like to term it, the most successful defensive alliance in history, will again be understood by the next US leadership.
The other line in defense of NATO, from the UK, and I think European perspective, as reflected in the words of NATO Secretary General, Rutte, is that the UK and Europe simply cannot survive or defend themselves without the US backstop - as was seen in the UK-French led intervention in Libya, but which only “succeeded” because Obama was eventually persuaded to backstop the endeavor.
They would argue that the alliance with the US allows the UK and others to still punch above their weight on the global stage because of the critical support from the US, including intelligence, heavy lifting/logistics, air defense, etc.
For the UK, in particular, our defense autonomy from the US remains hamstrung by our dependency on the US to provide and service the Tomahawk missiles that carry our ‘independent’ nuclear deterrent, and the U. F35s, which still fly off our two aircraft carriers, while the UK has been unable to provide the finance to provide the full complement of UK jets. Why we decided to go for two white elephant aircraft carriers we cannot afford to man, or escort, is beyond me, but it explains the defense failures identified above.
It is complicated because of the truly disastrous decisions around defense made in the over ambitious defense strategies ( trying to do too much with Global Britain as opposed to just Defending Britain) past – not clearly understanding the risks to the UK and Europe, often not adequately explaining these to our populations, so not spending enough on defense, and then building in too much reliance and dependency on the US.
All this has taken us to a point where for the UK, at least, I think part of the warm words over special relationship is that while there is an understanding that the US and UK’s national security interests and core values may no longer dovetail, we are just too impregnated by the US defense establishment to disentangle these without compromising our core defense in the short term.
In trying to justify clinging to the US-UK special relationship, I also heard a reference to the fact that we should still focus on our shared interests. I would question whether we still have any left under the Trump presidency.
And herein it is now surely clear with the war now in Iran, the decapitation operation in Venezuela, a similar operation likely in Cuba, territorial claims to Canada and Greenland, Trump talking about deals with Russia, that US and UK, European core security interests are not closely aligned. For the UK and Europe, the number one – by far – existential threat is Russia. And yet Trump talks about business deals and the moderation of sanctions against Russia.
For the UK and Europe, the number one – by far – existential threat is Russia. And yet Trump talks about business deals and the moderation of sanctions against Russia.
For the UK and Europe, Iran, Venezuela, Cuba, and China are low on the list of pressing national security risks. But China is obviously number one for the US, regardless of the hue of the administration. Clearly, Iran and defending Israel are high priorities for the US. But they are low risks/interests for the UK and Europe.
Well, until the latter case, the Trump administration decided to embark on its catastrophic war with Iran. Actually, this is a case where US interests work aggressively against UK or European interests, as the US intervention has set a fire under the Gulf, boosted oil prices, and disrupted supply chains, threatening the stability of the global economy much more to the detriment of energy-importing Europe than to the energy-exporting US. Higher oil prices have also helped Russia by filling its coffers and enabling it to wage its war on Ukraine and Europe longer.
The US is now whining about the fact that NATO allies have not rushed to support the US endeavor, but why should they when this intervention works exactly against their interests? And why should other non-NATO allies put their troops’ lives on the line to become an enemy and target of Iran? The US never asked its allies’ opinions on the war – they had no input in the decision, so why would they now feel compelled to make an input to the war effort?
Even on the idea of common values, I would doubt that most European leaders would support Trump’s threats of genocide against Iran, and to conduct war crimes against Iran. Or the Trump administration’s support of far-right, extremist forces in Europe - EDL leader Tommy Robinson was even a recent guest at the State Department. And many of the tweets, or “truths,” of Trump now appear xenophobic, racist, Islamophobic, and suggest a White Christian Supremacist agenda.
Is that where the UK and Europe are now? Opinion polls in the UK still show a nearly 60-40 split between center/center-left and liberal parties versus the right and the extreme right. Public opinion in the UK and Europe rejects Trump’s values.
I would contend that the US and Europe and the UK are now miles apart on both interests and values, and clinging to the idea that something will change at the next US election, or that we have no choice but to hang on to the current alliance as long as possible in the hope that something will turn in the US, is just very wishful - actually no damning right dangerous - thinking.
It does rather remind me of the scene from the UK movie Carry on up the Kyber, where a bunch of toff British colonial officers try to maintain the stiff upper lip while keeping their exposure at dinner, while their troops hold off an overwhelming enemy onslaught outside their dining mess. Eventually, victory is ensured, though, by thinking outside the box, or kilt, for those who know the movie, and indeed, I would be in favor of showing Trump what lies behind the kilt. Telling Trump where to get off, and maybe he would TACO on this issue, too.
Indeed, I would argue that a better strategy would be to be open about the rift in NATO. Rutte, rather than calling Trump “Daddy,” should confront him and make Trump own up to the fact that he is killing NATO.
Does Trump really want to be the POTUS who killed the greatest defense alliance in history? And pushing allies, to boot, into China’s arms. And if Trump does not like it and threatens us with tariffs, well, we should learn from China, and TACO and go head-to-head with Trump in a tariff war, as he would inevitably back off if his beloved S&P dropped.
We should avoid another Turnburry calamity, where Europe simply soiled its pants and waved the White Flag, took an asymmetric tariff deal to buy Trump off on NATO, which spectacularly failed. As with all bullies, Trump took the bribe of lower tariffs and asked for more on NATO.
Instead, we should explain that not only will Trump be responsible for the end of NATO, but Europe will move away from writing big cheques for US military kit and will absolutely not be there for the US if we end up seeing a final hegemonic clash between the US and China. But we would, if the US respected European interests again on NATO and on European interests in supporting Ukraine and countering Russia.
But we should, in the interim, fast-track the development of an autonomous defense (from the US). We need to imagine the worst – that NATO is dead, and the US backstop is not there, as all these fairy tales that the US-UK, or NATO special relationship is still there just creates a false sense of security, and means we don’t still spend enough on our own defense, and we do move fast enough to secure our own autonomous defense.
So, can Europe defend itself against the existential Russian threat without the US? I think it can, but we have to think outside the box (under the kilt), and look to broaden the European alliance.
First things first, Ukraine is now the strongest military force in Europe, aside from Russia. Ukraine, through innovation and bravery, has stopped a far more numerically superior military force. Its capabilities in drones are now world-leading, and the wars in Ukraine and Gulf War III have shown how drones have changed the nature of warfare. Ukraine can help Europe train to defend itself much better and with fewer resources. But we need to institutionalize Ukraine’s defense relationship with Europe while Ukraine remains interested.
So, can Europe defend itself against the existential Russian threat without the US? I think it can, but we have to think outside the box (under the kilt), and look to broaden the European alliance.
Second, Türkiye is a close military peer to Ukraine and has scale in terms of troop numbers (400,000 regular, 300,000 reserve) and its drone and military industrial complex. Like Ukraine, Türkiye is battle-hardened and experienced in warfare. But Europe needs to put past prejudices behind it and reach out for deeper defense cooperation with Türkiye if it is going to be able to counter the existential threat from Russia without the U.S. backstop. Türkiye can provide the manufacturing scale to immediately moonshot European defense capabilities, but it needs financing and technology exchange.
Third, Poland is now spending big time on defense (close to 6% of GDP) and will be increasingly armed with new (much South Korean) and effective kit, plus it has a large and motivated army.
Fourth, Finland brought enormous military capability to European NATO, with 1 million or so trained regular/irregular troops, and particular experience and motivation in fighting Russia. It has significant long-range strike capability.
Fifth, Germany is finally understanding of the threats from Russia, and the fact the US is AWOL – even a threat. It is now spending big time on defense and its huge and powerful industrial complex will soon retool to defense. Give Germany 3-5 years, and it can fill many of the gaps left by the US, but its deep fiscal pockets will allow others to accelerate the defense transition.
Add in the military institutional memories, or DNA, and defense tech capabilities of the UK and France, if not the treasure, but then with the additional spending power of the Scandies/Nordics, and Europe should absolutely be able to counter and stop the Russian threat.
Important, I think, though, is Europe understanding the specific prime threat – Russia – and the likes of the UK, France, Italy, perhaps not getting sidelined by broader defense ambitions. Russia is the threat, and the question is how do we defend the UK’s shores and Europe against that specific threat?
Surely with a population four times the size of Russia, and a combined GDP perhaps 15 times, Europe can get its act together and fill the void left by the US. But critically, we need to cast off the faint hopes that the U.S. still shares the same interests or values, or if not now, will mean-revert very shortly.
No, what happens if it does not? We have to assume the worst and plan for that now. If we don’t, then the UK and Europe will be on the menu in the Great Power World seemingly craved now by Trump, Putin, and Xi.
See the original in the author’s @tashen.com bloghere.
The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.
