Senior IDF officer: 1,000 days since Oct. 7 changed how Israel fights its enemies

An officer with a highly sensitive operational role on October 7 opened a professional discussion this week about the lessons of that terrible day, saying that "As a middle-ranking officer in the IDF, I look at the commanders above me and below me, and I tell you, we have changed. I am not the same person, and the army is not the same army it was 1,000 days ago."

"The way we look today at an emerging threat, our approach toward the enemy is different. Today there is no such thing as no response. That thinking is different from before, when with all kinds of matters like this we would simply walk away," he said.

He gave an example of the change in mindset.

"Just today, an hour ago, there was an elimination of a terrorist on the outskirts of Nabatiya. In the army of the past, we would not have dared attack him because there was a ceasefire, and maybe they would respond. Today? It does not matter if they respond."

One thousand days of fighting have passed since the October 7 massacre, and the IDF is still occupied with several efforts: protecting the Israeli home front from the possibility of raids on communities and outposts from Lebanon, Jordan, the West Bank, Syria and the Gaza Strip, while also investigating the events of the war, drawing lessons and dealing with force buildup.

Against the backdrop of the enormous trauma of October 7, the total failure of the IDF General Staff, the intelligence blind spot, the collapse of all the defense systems on the border and the enormous difficulty in repelling attacks in the first 12 hours, the most central move made by the IDF with the political leadership's backing has been maneuvering deep inside enemy territory, establishing itself there and creating a broad security belt and strategic depth for the State of Israel. No more defense along the border line.

In practice, the IDF has captured about 70% of the Gaza Strip, refugee camps in Samaria, large areas in the Syrian Golan Heights, and created a buffer zone in southern Lebanon.

The situation with Jordan is more complex. On the one hand, it is a peace border, but the threat from Palestinian refugee camps is more tangible than ever. Therefore, the change was dictated by the fragile reality, and the 96th Division was established under Brig.-Gen. Oren Simcha on the eastern border.

The move allows broad operational control. Unlike a regional brigade in the past, which focused mainly on managing day-to-day tactical challenges, a division can lead wide-ranging systemic processes and provide a more comprehensive response to emerging threats. In the new division, forward outposts were also quickly staffed under the IDF concept before the communities.

The IDF makes a clear distinction between a threat of infiltration or raid on communities and outposts, and a threat from missiles, rockets and drones, or a lone terrorist who manages to exploit weaknesses in the military system, such as the terrorist who infiltrated from Lebanon several weeks ago and reached the fence of Moshav Margaliot.

"I make a distinction between how the IDF thinks today and its actions. Today we can act like this, tomorrow we can act. Our biggest change? The thinking, the ideas and the behavior," the officer said, adding, "What else changed? Today we believe in the threat, much more than we believed then."

The IDF fell into a deep pit it dug for itself over the years, based on the belief in a protective trinity that was considered invulnerable: a strong fence with 64 kilometers of technology along it, a high-quality intelligence and collection system that accumulated but did not change the thinking and did not become a strategic warning, and excessive confidence in the quality of regular forces that were expected to stand few against many. In today's view, it is clear that this combination, which was supposed to be Israel's shield wall, collapsed within minutes before the bloody reality of October 7.

The initial lessons learned since then have brought about a revolution in the IDF's defense concept, one that abandons static positioning on Israeli soil, similar to what happened before the evacuation of tents from Mount Dov or attacks on IDF outposts and a weak response, in favor of operational dynamism.

The main change is reflected in the redefinition of the area: the IDF no longer relies only on a narrow contact line between the fence and the community, but clearly distinguishes between "security zones," areas whose purpose is airtight protection of the communities and prevention of enemy infiltration, and "holding zones", areas in enemy territory where a continuous operational presence of IDF soldiers is maintained. That presence ensures a high level of operational control, prevents infiltration into the area, and helps enable a rapid transition to attack.

Another key lesson is the multi-tiered response: instead of relying on a single physical obstacle and forces on the border, the IDF has adopted a model of deep defense, one that allows broad and flexible deterrence in every sector.

This is not only a different tactical deployment, but also a mindset shift described by Defense Minister Israel Katz as a "new normal": moving from passive defense that waits for an event to active defense designed to prevent the extreme scenario from materializing in the first place. In Katz's view, that is not going to change in the coming years, and the IDF must adapt in terms of personnel, equipment and replacements.

In addition, the layers of defense and response times from the air, the ground and the sea have changed beyond recognition, including in the Judea and Samaria Division under Brig.-Gen. Kobi Heller, who insisted on renewing orders, creating reserves of fighters who can be called up from home and expanding cooperation with the air force while shortening response times.

One thousand days of fighting, but also of investigation, learning, and combat, now place the IDF in a new operational mindset whose purpose is to ensure that the collapse of October 2023 remains only a bitter historical memory that fundamentally changed the way the state is defended.

"The residents are no longer at the edge like before, but the soldiers are," the officer said.

"Both on the border and in enemy territory, we are deployed much, much more, and much better prepared than before. The amount of weapons in the communities has increased, as has security in the communities themselves. So has the way the outposts are built," the officer said.

The reality on the ground leaves no room for doubt. At this point, there is a significant gap between the Northern and Southern Commands. While in the north substantial upgrades were made to reinforce the outposts, in the Gaza Division the same mistakes were repeated, or the same gaps remained as in the days before October 7.

In the background, commanders and residents, especially in areas close to the border, always fear erosion in orders, readiness and manpower, as happened this week in Southern Command when it was decided to cut back on reserve soldiers who had staffed the command centers in the various regional councils since October 7 to support the effort to defend the communities.

"I go around with the Northern Command chief, meeting reserve, standing and regular forces. Just for that, it is worth going around and eating all the dust in the field. They are amazing, and the career soldiers are even more amazing," the officer said.

The officer shared a painful farewell he recently experienced.

"There are battalion commanders who have not seen home for three years. And Dor (Lt.-Col. Dor Gedalia Ben Simhon, 52nd Battalion commander, killed in southern Lebanon), his fall was a painful blow to all of us. His wife is my deputy, and he was a close friend. He was the chief of staff to the Northern Command chief previously. His name fit him well. One in a generation (dor)."

He added that "there are many battalion commanders, reservists, career soldiers who are in the field and are bringing in very significant achievements; I hope they will bring the area a better future."

He emphasized that "the IDF did not meet its commitment on October 7. Beyond a doubt. I did not meet my commitment. On a personal level, we are talking about the failure."

The officer said that an infiltration incident like the one that occurred in Margaliot could happen again, but stressed: "But it is not the October 7 of thousands who went walking through the communities, and murder, and massacre, and rape, and looting, etc. As for Margaliot? We investigated, learned, and drew lessons. I very much hope it will not happen again; I cannot promise 100%. But is there a scenario in which 1,500 terrorists from Hamas's Nukhba Force sit on the fence during a large-scale surprise raid? The answer is no."

He shared that despite the huge failure, the IDF has picked itself up since October 7. "We fought like lions every moment. You hear brigade commanders all the time saying, 'Let me run forward.'"

He revealed that "there is no night and no morning when October 7 is not in my head, or what I could have done better."