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Is publicly confronting the likely next prime minister of Iraq the right strategy for the United States? The nomination of Nouri al Maliki by the Coordination Framework, the organizing body of Shiite politics in Iraq, on Jan. 24, and the blunt and public objection by President Donald Trump three days later, have exposed a growing political crisis with major implications for U.S. interests in Iraq and the broader Middle East.Rather than weakening Maliki, the intervention has galvanized Shiite political actors under the banner of national sovereignty — including those who do not typically support him. Maliki’s nomination reflects deeper structural problems in Iraq’s system of government formation that Trump has only intensified. Indeed, Maliki’s selection exemplifies how Iraq’s elite-driven power-sharing system produces such a tense outcome. The dispute over Maliki poses legal and electoral challenges for Iraq and will likely continue to stir major political, security, and economic crises, particularly around sovereignty, foreign meddling, and America’s role in the region.
While there are multiple options out of this crisis, the best for both Baghdad and Washington would be for the latter to commit to sustained and deep engagement with Iraq. This would support U.S. efforts to counter Iran by strengthening institutional capacity, reducing reliance on and leverage of Iran and its local allies, and helping position Baghdad as a strategic partner. This approach far better serves Washington’s goal of weakening Iranian influence, while avoiding costly escalation.
A Surprising Nomination
At the domestic level, Maliki’s nomination is difficult to understand for several reasons. First, Maliki has been outside the public spotlight since he was forced out of the premiership in 2014 following a convergence of external and internal pressures, especially by the Shiite religious authority in Najaf. That decision was foundational because it was based on his inclination to concentrate power in his office and the hollowing out of state institutions, which resulted in the subsequent collapse of Iraqi security forces and the fall of Mosul to the so-called Islamic State in June 2014.
Second, it is surprising because local political actors have a near-universal understanding of Maliki as a politically dominant figure, precisely the quality that sidelined him and the quality that his rivals in the Coordination Framework fear the most, threatening to almost certainly overshadow them and limit their access to power and patronage. As history demonstrates, he is a consolidator-in-chief par excellence. Maliki is most known for his legacy of establishing informal chains of command, directly from his office, that bypassed established institutions including the Ministries of Defense, Interior, and others.
Third, it is difficult to understand because he is still seen as a deeply divisive leader by other communities in the country, especially the Sunni Arabs who associate him with sectarian governance, marginalization, and political exclusion dating back to 2010. Indeed, the National Political Council, the organizing body of Sunni politics, declared on Jan. 27 its formal objection to Maliki’s nomination. Under the leadership of the former speaker of parliament, Mohammed al Halbousi, the council explicitly stated that it will neither vote for Maliki nor participate in any government he leads. In Iraq’s communal consensus-based system, this alone casts major doubt on his ability to govern effectively.
Fourth, Maliki’s polarizing reputation extends beyond the Sunnis. His long-standing, strained relationship with powerful Shiite leader Muqtada al Sadr adds a major layer of risk. In this context, Sadr’s silence on the Maliki-Trump tiff should not be mistaken for acquiescence. More likely, it reflects Sadr’s strategic calculation, a pattern he has engaged in since withdrawing from politics in Aug. 2022 following the 2021 parliamentary elections. Sadr is likely to have anticipated the inability of Maliki to survive the screening process of prime minister nominations — which also requires a degree of international acceptance — and thus may have seen little value in intervening prematurely. But if Maliki overcomes all hurdles and is elected as the next prime minister, Sadr poses a far greater threat to Maliki’s ability to govern than any Sunni or parliamentary opposition. This is because Sadr could mobilize millions at a moment’s notice with the power to paralyze major parts of Iraq, impose serious political costs, and render governance extraordinarily difficult if not impossible.
Finally, what makes Maliki’s nomination even more bizarre is that it violates the Coordination Framework’s own criteria for selecting nominees for the highest political office in the land. The bloc has long insisted that its candidate must meet three criteria: receive the internal consensus of the bloc, ensure broad communal consensus from other major communities in the country, and enjoy a good measure of international support. Maliki satisfies none of these. His selection can be seen as a quiet abandonment of the framework’s own governing logic.
The Structural Problem of Government Formation in Iraq
Maliki’s nomination reveals a more structural aspect of Iraqi governance: that the process that produced it is conducted outside parliament by mostly unelected leaders. Though Iraq is a parliamentary democracy, the decision to elect officials has rarely been the outcome of parliamentary bargaining, legislative coalition-building, or transparent post-election negotiations. Instead, it has been the result of elite negotiations and deal-making among a small circle of powerbrokers. This has always been the case, but has become entrenched with the creation of communal houses: for the Shiites, it is the Coordination Framework, since 2021. Regrettably, elites took the communal logic of the ethno-sectarian power-sharing arrangement to distorted extremes and emptied it of its original purpose of ensuring communal representation proportionate to national demographics. No serious Iraqi actor or observer of Iraqi politics disputes the communal logic of the political system. The prime minister will remain Shiite. That reality is broadly accepted. What is contested is how the prime minister is chosen. When elections can be effectively neutralized by post-hoc elite alliances and when popular winners of elections are denied a first move at government formation, the credibility of the entire process erodes. Elections become rituals, rather than mechanisms for change or accountability, if selecting prime ministers ultimately rests with a few leaders. Maliki’s nomination signifies a deeper problem found today in Iraqi politics: that political outcomes are settled behind closed doors. This is a feature, not a bug, in Iraq’s post-2003 electoral system, adopted to mostly serve the interests of newly empowered exiled and dissident elites.
As is often the case in Iraq’s politics, when the time comes to decide on prime minister candidates, the largest bloc, the Coordination Framework, would first test the waters of the five major relevant factors: the Shiite religious authority in Najaf, Iran, the United States, Sunnis, and Kurds. What has most likely transpired, deduced from the limited public knowledge on this issue, is that the Coordination Framework had received the blessing from Iran to move forward with Maliki, while receiving no concrete responses from either Najaf or the Kurds. This left only the Sunnis with a clear objection to Maliki, which the Coordination Framework may have interpreted as too small an issue to block Maliki’s return. The fact that Maliki has managed to get members of the Sunni bloc on his side, most notably Muthana al Samari of the Azim political bloc and Thabit al Abbasi of the Hasm bloc, likely made his concern about Sunni objection minimal. That leaves the United States. Amid all this, the Trump administration appeared less interested in specific individuals and more in how they would address its two top priorities: weakening Iran’s influence and taking on Iran’s allies in Iraq. From this perspective, Maliki was singled out not for his persona per se, but for a worldview that the administration understands as empowering, not weakening, Iran and its Iraqi allies. It is a mistake, then, to suggest that replacing Maliki with another member of the Coordination Framework, if perceived to be aligned with Iran, would solve this dispute. In any event, the Coordination Framework is mistaken if it had calculated that Maliki would be Trump’s top choice given his track record of taking on armed groups, famously the Sadrist’s al-Mahdi Army during Operation Knight’s Charge in 2008. Add to this the fact that Maliki has sold himself to the Iraqi public on precisely this platform: that he is the only leader capable of restraining unruly armed elements, highlighting his soft-power influence on the groups. The Coordination Framework might have put all these thoughts together and decided to go with Maliki.
Trump’s Position on Maliki’s Nomination
Into this messy and polarizing environment came Trump with his unequivocal Truth Social post opposing Maliki’s return to office.
The reaction in Baghdad was one of strong opposition to what has been interpreted as a violation of Iraqi sovereignty. To be sure, Iraqis have always expected that Washington has a preference for leaders, but that Trump chose to express it so publicly, in language intended to coerce, is what seems to have irritated and provoked the opposition. Maliki responded by condemning the “blatant American interference,” refusing to withdraw, and reframing the contest as a test of Iraq’s autonomy and independence. Days later, the Coordination Framework closed ranks and reaffirmed its earlier decision, emphasizing that choosing Maliki was an internal constitutional matter. The opposition is also rooted in the logic that conceding to U.S. pressure would set a bad precedent and lead to more demands in the future, including possibly the dissolution of their community-rooted security forces, the Popular Mobilization Forces.
In all this, there appears to be a clear breakdown in communication between Washington and Baghdad, which led to misperceptions at the heart of this crisis. These include the appointment and rapid firing of inexperienced Mark Savaya as a special envoy and the absence of a confirmed U.S. ambassador. Together, this signals to elites and leaders in Baghdad and beyond that Washington does not prioritize its relationship with Iraq.
Many Iraqis, at both the popular and political levels, fear that Trump, in order not to lose face, will move ahead with his threats if Maliki is elected. This may mean imposing sanctions, striking elements of the Popular Mobilization Forces that the administration considers proxies of Iran, reducing or cutting diplomatic ties, and most consequentially, wrecking the banking and financial sector by cutting or reducing dollar inflow to the country, which Baghdad relies on to finance its imports. Indeed, the United States has had decisive control over Iraqi oil revenue since 2003.
If Trump were to impose punitive measures on Iraq, its economy could unravel within days. The country is already struggling to pay public-sector salaries due to years of fiscal mismanagement. Any disruption in oil revenue would trigger social unrest and institutional collapse. Disrupted U.S.-Iraqi security cooperation, namely joint operations, training, and intelligence sharing, could inadvertently allow terrorist groups space to make a comeback. Notably, Iraq has recently agreed to take custody from Syria of some 7,000 Islamic State terrorists, over 5,700 of whom have already been imprisoned. Managing these high-level detainees requires funding, secure facilities, intelligence sharing, and close bilateral coordination. Economic and financial shocks would likely weaken an already fragile political and security environment. The U.S.-built Iraqi Counterterrorism Service is believed to be “the most significant and capable counterterrorism force in the Middle East.”
It is therefore important that the Trump administration take action to deescalate the situation for four reasons. First, opposing Maliki has produced diminishing returns. It has demonstrated a familiar pattern of strengthening the very actors that Washington hopes to marginalize by allowing them to rally around the flag against external threats.
Second, U.S. meddling also benefits Iraqi hardliners. The Coordination Framework is already divided along two major axes. Such external pressure in domestic electoral outcomes could generate a crisis of moderation as groups compete to outbid one another to legitimatize claims to sovereignty and national defense, making compromise difficult.
Third, the implications extend well beyond Iraq. For the United States, the stakes are high. They involve critical U.S. interests in Iraq, threatening to reverse decades of strategic investments in electoral support, cooperation in counter-terrorism and reducing illicit trade, bolstering Iraq’s role in regional mediation and stability, and the long-term viability of the state.
Finally, the United States would benefit from emphasizing respect for Iraqi sovereignty and institutions, celebrating the peaceful transfer of power, while privately holding leaders accountable for failing to meet Washington’s legitimate concerns. This is crucial given that the Iraqi public’s perceptions of the United States as a reliable partner have declinedin recent years. What is seen as electoral meddling will only reinforce the belief that Iraq’s sovereignty and electoral outcomes are dependent on U.S. interests. Such diplomatic hazards have detrimental consequences in both the short and long term because they will rupture America’s strategic depth in a country that arguably has the most precarious but important geopolitical and geostrategic position in its relations with Turkey, Iran, Syria, and the Arab Gulf states.
Possible Ways Out of the Crisis
It is well known that both Maliki and Trump have strong personalities, and thus it is unlikely that either will back down. But there are still ways out of the crisis. One obvious way is for Maliki to withdraw his candidacy. This is difficult at this point, though maybe possible if he were to be compensated with something he deeply cares about, such as the Coordination Framework presidency. Historically, internal rivalries within the body have prevented agreement on leadership.
Another way out is for the Coordination Framework to continue with Maliki’s nomination, as a face-saving measure, but agree behind the scenes with the Sunni and Kurdish blocs to either not show up for the voting session in parliament or vote against him in the secret ballot.
A third way out is also a face-saving measure. It involves moving ahead with Maliki’s nomination all the way to confirming him in parliament as prime minister designate but have him deadlocked when trying to form a government. It would not be the first time a prime minister candidate failed to form a government within the 30-day constitutional deadline. In 2020, Mohammed Tawfiq Allawi and Adnan al Zurfi both failed to form a government before the deadline, forcing their withdrawal. The replacement of candidates, following public external pressure, however, makes Iraq’s government-formation process susceptible to foreign influence. While ditching Maliki may appease Trump now, in the long run, it will inevitably undermine the Iraqi people’s faith in and credibility of the electoral process — a crucial litmus test for Iraq’s nascent democracy — especially given that it is the only country in the Middle East that holds regular elections that are considered free and fair by international observers.
A more feasible option is to allow Iraq’s multitude of stakeholders to determine the future of their government and for Washington to commit to sustained, cooperative, and substantive diplomatic, economic, and strategic dialogue and presence in the country. This means investing in stacking the U.S. embassy with well-trained diplomats with deep knowledge of Iraq and the region; calibrating Washington’s multipronged interests according to national and subnational realities and political stakeholders, including the Kurds and Sunni Arabs; continuing to invest in the various military and counter-terrorism capacity-building initiatives already in place; and seeing Iraq as both a mediating and influential actor in Washington’s posture toward Iran and the region as a whole. This, in the long run, will enable Iraqi elites to view Washington’s policy toward their country as one based on an equal and mutually beneficial partnership.
Yasir Kuoti is a Ph.D. student in political science at Boston University, with particular focus on Middle East politics and U.S. Middle East policy. From 2018 to 2024, he served as senior political advisor in Baghdad.
Shamiran Mako is an assistant professor of international relations and political science at the Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University and a research fellow at the Crown Center for Middle East Studies at Brandeis University.
Image: Zoheir Seidanloo via Wikimedia Commons
